# 1nc

### 1NC

#### Everything after the colon matters.

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to find solution for the plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 [www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### “Should” denotes an expectation of that

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### “The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C.

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

#### and, our definition excludes action by smaller political groups or individuals.

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) 1999

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

#### (by the way you do not have to read the bold – that’s why they’re not bolded)

#### To maximize the three hours we have together, three preconditions must be met ---- The affirmative’s failure to advance these 3 pre-requisites undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

1. Two teams oppose sides- the affirmative has the burden of proof to prove a change from the status quo in direction of the resolution and the negative has the burden of rejoinder (conflict-based scenario)

1. Debate should have a voted-on resolution that is established prior the debate (knowledge aspect)

2. Each side has equal times to speaking in the debate (game resources)

Harr et al 8, Rasmus Harr (IT University of Copenhagen, Center for Computer Games Research, Copenhagen, Denmark), Tasha Buch (School of Education, University of Aarhus, Department for Educational Anthropology, Copenhagen, Denmark), Thorkild Hanghøj (University of Southern Denmark, Department of Media Science, Odense, Denmark), “Exploring the discrepancy between educational goals and educational game design,” 2008, http://www.itu.dk/people/rasmusharr/08\_05%20ECGBL\_paper\_final.doc

According to Jan Klabbers, the study of educational games (i.e. simulations and video games) stems from different research traditions (Klabbers 2006). Thus, we need a broad, cross-disciplinary conceptualization of educational games, which can be accepted by different disciplines that all have different criteria for validating knowledge. In order to solve this epistemological problem, Klabbers draws upon the social anthropologist Frederick Barth’s theory on the anthropology of knowledge, which can be used to describe different “traditions of knowledge” (Barth 2002: 3). For Barth, a tradition of knowledge can be defined analytically in relation to a substantive corpus of assertions, a range of media and representations, and a social organisation (Barth 2002). Based upon this framework, Klabbers argues that a game embeds assertions and **ideas about the world in three ways**: In the rule-base of the game, in the resources of the game, and in the players and their knowledge. Game media of representation include game boards, papers, pencils, multimedia computers etc. Similarly, games are distributed, communicated, employed, and transmitted within particular social institutions – i.e. large organisations or school settings (Klabbers 2006: 71). The three aspects of knowledge (assertions, representations, social organisation) are **interconnected and** **determine each other mutually** (Klabbers 2006: 72, Barth 2002: 3). This dynamic resembles Gee’s notion of semiotic domains defined by distinct forms of “content”, literacies, and social practices, which can be designed to engage and manipulate people in certain ways (Gee 2003: 43 ff). The point here is that any tradition of knowledge – i.e. educational games or teaching practices – generates tradition-specific criteria for validating knowledge. In order to understand the relationship between educational games and educational goals, we wish to concentrate on how educational games are played within the formal context of classroom settings. Thus, the knowledge aspects of gaming can be compared with the knowledge aspects of teaching (Jank & Meyer 2006). See table 1 below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Knowledge aspect** | **Teaching** | **Gaming** |
| Assertions | Educational goals, content, norms, and values | Conflict-based scenario with roles, rules, and goals |
| Modes of representation | Teacher-pupil dialogue and available learning resources | Realisable resources (depends upon particular game format/genre) |
| Social organisation | Organisation of teaching and learning activities | Realisation of game assertions and resources |

Table 1: Teaching and gaming as dual traditions of knowledge

Obviously, the different knowledge aspects of gaming and **teaching are not to be seen as “equal**” entities as they are based upon different ontologies and different intentions. Instead, the purpose of the table above is to provide an analytical framework that makes it possible to understand the complex relationship between gaming practices and teaching practices. Thus, the parameters listed in the table may be used to promote further research and discussions on the design and use of educational games. However, for the purpose of this paper, we merely wish to focus on the relationship between educational games and educational goals within the context of classroom settings. We believe that this focus should be a crucial concern for educational game researchers. Thus, there exists an abundance of theory on educational games, but there are relatively few empirical studies of whether or how educational games are able to realise their intended educational goals (Klabbers 2006, Sefton-Green 2006, van Eck 2007).

2.1. A socio-cultural approach to game-based learning

A meta-theory on educational gaming should not be limited a priori to any particular learning theory. Rather, we believe that the choice of learning theory for understanding educational games must depend upon **actual research questions**, the **knowledge aspects of a given game** and the **educational goals**, which the game intends to help the player/pupil to fulfil. As we wish to focus on the players/pupils’ own experience of playing educational games within a formal school setting, we believe that a socio-cultural approach provides a valuable theoretical framework (Linderoth 2004, Hanghøj in press). Thus, in this paper, we will not include perspectives on cognitive an d constructivist learning processes. However, before presenting our assumptions of game-based learning in more detail, we will first describe the faces of knowledge embedded in the educational video game Global Conflicts: Palestine game design and its intended educational goals.

2.2. Global Conflicts: Palestine as an anthropology of knowledge

On the game website, GC: P is described as a 3D role-playing simulation game, “which gives the chance to explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict first-hand” (http://learning.seriousgames.dk/learn-more.aspx, last visited 28-05-2008). The game is targeted at pupils of the age of 12+ in relation to school subjects such as citizenship, history, and media studies. The game lets the player take on the role as a freelance journalist who is sent on various news assignments by an editor. These consists of doing research in order to write an article by walking around in the 3D environment and “interviewing” different sides of the conflict through the acquisition of “quotes”. The quotes are then used for putting together a newspaper article. Before going out to interview people on each assignment, the player will have to choose which newspaper to write for – an Israeli, a Palestinian, or a European newspaper. Having chosen a news angle the player will experience the difficulty of getting enough information from all sides of the story when researching different sides of the conflict: If the player chooses either the Israeli or Palestinian newspaper, the opposite part will be hesitant to deliver information. Similarly, if the player has chosen the more balanced European newspaper then people from both the Israeli and Palestinian side will be suspicious. When a mission is accomplished, the player calls the editorial office, and by making use of the collected quotes, the player constructs an article with a headline and illustrating pictures. The goal is to accomplish as high a news value in the article as possible. This is done by finding as good quotes as possible.

According to the website of Serious Games Interactive (SGI), the company behind GC: P, the game themes include human rights, terrorism, and the role of media. Furthermore, the game is intended to teach the pupils specific skills and competences in terms of critical thinking in relation to news sources, being able to write an article as well as the appreciation of different perspectives on the ideological conflict. In order to achieve these educational goals, the game is intended to support the pupils’ learning processes through a series of motivating elements by providing a safe, engaging, and realistic environment.

If we look at the knowledge aspects in this educational game, there are certain values embedded in educational intentions of the game and in the actual game design as it is realized in the classroom. Thus, the game is a 3D single-player role-playing game created for use in formal educational environments for teaching citizenship, history, and media. Consequently, the assertions, modes of representation, and the social organization around the game are very much dictated by the formal educational environment of a school, a classroom, pupils, a teacher, and perhaps an IT-room.

2.3. Turning meta-theory into an analytical tool

In order to couple our meta-theory of educational games to the analysis of GC: P, we will apply perspectives from multimodal theory (Kress 2001). Briefly put, multimodal theory seeks to extend the linguistic origins of social semiotics to include sound, visual images and other forms of representation in order to show how different modalities of communication are combined in different kinds of media. This perspective is especially targeted at the design and use of digital media, which plays a large role in contemporary forms of communication and education (Kress 2001, Kress 2005, Jewitt 2008). Thus, multimodal theory is highly relevant for our analysis of the various modalities embedded within the 3D role-playing environment of GC:P..

One of the central assumptions in multimodal theory is that modalities are not equally suited to fulfil particular semiotic purposes. In order to explore the relationship between modality and purpose, Kress adapts Gibson’s notion of “affordance” (Gibson 1979, Kress 2005). Thus, for Kress, affordance refers to “distinct potentials and limitations for representation of the various modes” (Kress 2005: 12). This means that teachers and pupils tend to act differently, when presented with different modalities and their respective affordances. On the other hand, it is not possible to predict exactly how different teachers and pupils will respond to the affordances of different modalities (Prior 2005).

The main point here is that it is possible to understand the educational potential of a video game by performing an empirical analysis that compares the intentions of the game design and the actual realisation of game design. Burn and Carr have presented a model for analysing video games via multimodal theory (Burn 2003). According to this model, it is possible to identify three different areas of motivation for meaning-making processes in relation to game designs. These areas include: ludic motivations (strategy, goals, skills acquisition, exploration, rules), representational motivations (dramatic, narrative, performative aspects) and communal motivations (the game’s generic identity and wider digital culture).

2.4. Choosing a learning theoretical framework

As suggested by GC:P’s self-description, the game intends to facilitate learning processes, which feature an active learner that experiments and explores different perspectives through critical thinking. Thus, we believe that John Dewey’s theory of inquiry-based learning is a suitable theory for describing the intended learning goals and processes of the game (Dewey 1916, 1933). According to Dewey, pupils learn by inquiring into particular problems through a continual construction and re-construction of experience-based forms of knowledge. Inspired by Dewey, James Paul Gee presents this as a four-stage process, where the player: 1) probes a virtual world, 2) forms a hypothesis based upon reflections, 3 reprobes the game world with that hypothesis in mind, and 4) treats the feedback from the game world through rethinking of his/her original hypothesis (Gee 2003: 90).

Analogous to his theory of inquiry-based learning, Dewey used the metaphorical image of a "dramatic rehearsal" to describe how individuals make moral and ethical decisions by a playing through of “various competing possible lines of action" in their mind (Dewey 1922: 190). Thus, when pupils enter the scenario of GC:P, they must explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a journalist's perspective and interview the characters within the game world by playing through and enacting different moral and strategic choices in relation to their journalistic aims and the game characters' assigned norms and values.

3. Empirical study

In this section, we will present GC: P through the lens of a multimodal analysis, which relates the designed intentions of the game scenario to teachers and pupils’ perceptions of the realised game. This analysis does not represent a finished analysis, but consists of selected examples in line with the goal of this paper, which is to explore and discuss the discrepancy between the intentions of educational games and realised educational goals.

3.1. Setup

In this pilot study, GC:P was used in a simple 1 ½ hour set-up with a 9th grade (15-16 years of age), who played the news assignment “Military Raid”. The empirical findings consist of observations from the setup, combined with post-game interviews with the teacher and 8 pupils. The school was a lower secondary Danish public school in the economically well-to-do suburbs North of Copenhagen with a group of pupils that were relatively culturally homogenous. Furthermore, the school has a strong ICT-profile, as ICT is embedded in many activities of the everyday school life.

3.1.1. Building the newspaper article in GC: Palestine

Our empirical findings focus on the article writing and quote-system in GC:P. Thus, we will briefly describe how these work in the game. When a player has finished his or her collection of quotes via the in-game “interviews” the player calls in the article to “the editorial office”. Here there is a shift from the 3D world to a 2D article platform, where the player builds the article using the quotes taken during the interviews. As figure 1 shows the article platform is divided in two parts: An article template in the left of the screen and, to the right side of the screen, three categories with three possible options of which the article is build: headlines, notes and pictures. The headlines present three different political value sets: the Israeli perspective, the Palestinian perspective and the balanced perspective. The player must then choose the right headline that fits with the political angle of the article. Choosing one of three pictures to illustrate the content is optional.

Figure 1: Article template and feedback section in Global Conflicts: Palestine (SGI, 2007) April 2008.

Finally, the player selects three quotes out of the maximum of 15 quotes from the virtual notebook and place these three quotes as ‘head text’, ‘body text’ or ‘sub text’. Each quote is evaluated on its news value (see figure 1, left picture). At the bottom of the right side of the screen information is shown on the status of the article (total news value of the article and an Israeli/Palestinian alignment status on article level) and the status of the player progression (‘intern’, ‘apprentice’ and ‘reporter’-level and an Israeli/Palestinian alignment status on player level). When the article is constructed, the player sends it to the in-game newspaper office by pressing the submit button. Then a piece of evaluating text pops up explaining the editor’s perception of the article and its final placement in the newspaper (see figure 1, right picture).

3.2. Empirical findings

The preliminary analysis of the empirical data from the pilot study is primarily based upon observations and post-game interviews with selected pupils and the teacher, as well as the director of SGI behind GC: P. In the post-game interviews with the pupils, two main analytical themes on the article template emerged. The first theme concerns the structural design of the article template, while the second regards the perception of the quantitative versus qualitative evaluation of the quotes when “writing” the article.

Examining the first point, the pupils found the absence of syntactic coherence between the quotes in the article template to be quite problematic:

Pupil B: “It doesn’t really fit together as an article, and maybe that doesn’t matter, because afterwards you don’t need the article. But when there are three quotes and a picture, and there is no other text… well, I think it was difficult to make it fit together.”

Questioner: “You mean that the quotes didn’t fit in a verbal sense?”

Pupil B: “Yes, if there are three different points of views, and they are not really tied together, if you haven’t played the game yourself, right. If you just saw those three quotes, you would think ’what do these have to do with each other?’ They have something to do with each other, but it is quite difficult to show, when there is no…”

Questioner: [interrupts] “For other people to understand?”

Pupil B: “Yes, exactly.”

(Pupil focus group interview, no. 1, 10/04/2008)

It was a general experience among the pupils that the quotes in the article template were mutually incoherent, and therefore not tied together. Also, the meaning of the quotes was stripped from the context in which they were taken. In this way, it was difficult for the pupils to grasp the overall meaning of the article. Furthermore, many pupils were frustrated that they had no control over the composition of the text. This lack of control meant that they were not able to communicate and make other people understand the work they had been doing within the game. Thus, the pupils were more interested in the article as a product, which could be shown to others, instead of merely using the output for their own evaluation.

This leads us to the second point, which concerns the pupils’ need for qualifying the content of the article with their own personal conceptions of the context in a mission. Here they are asked for comments on the article platform:

Pupil B: “I just think that you should make the judgment yourself instead of the computer.”

Questioner: “Would that be nice if you could do that yourself?”

Pupil B: “It would be more interesting, because concerning this selection, you would discover ’okay, this is good’ or ’oh well, it isn’t, anyway’, then it is one’s own opinion when it is yourself writing the newspaper. And of course you would go after making it your own, but then again, you also wanted the best evaluation.”

Pupil A: “But there are only statements and quotes from the people, you didn’t report anything yourself at all.”

Pupil C: “There could have been some options where you could be able to write something yourself. (…)”

Questioner: “It could have been nice if this option was available?”

Pupil A: “Well, maybe that would have been more journalistic, or more right.”

Pupil C: “It would have been more personal, if you could express your own opinion, you could say.”

(Pupil focus group interview no. 2, 10/04/2008)

As this excerpt suggests, the pupils expressed a need for being able to evaluate the quotes and write the content in the article template themselves. Thus, the game content could be more interested if the pupils were allowed to evaluate and actually write as this would allow them to discover their own limits. Arguably, this feature could also create opportunities for critical thinking and re-construction of knowledge. Instead, the pupils’ response suggests that the players’ current possibilities for recognising his/her knowledge deficiencies are rather blurred.

Furthermore, the pupil’s lacking sense of self-control over the “interviews” with in-game characters and the imitated “writing” process were seen as problematic. Instead, they saw the possibility for actually writing a text within the game design as a motivational and challenging aspect in itself. The pupils also pointed out that more self-control over the text in the article template would add more realism to the journalist role. The teacher supports this interpretation in a separate interview, when describing her reflections on how the pupils’ reacted on playing GC:P.

“The pupils complained that they were able to figure it out in some way, when it [the quote] has a high news value. They were disappointed that it was ‘laid out on the table’. It would have been nice if they had to think for themselves, and then afterwards they could see whether it had news value or not, or more alignment, or what it was.”

(Teacher interview 10/04/2008, our markings)

The teacher would clearly value teaching her pupils critical and independent thinking. She would several times use the phrase “using the brain” during the play session and debriefing with the pupils, which, to her, represents the core of critical thinking. These findings points to a general discussion about quantitative and qualitative approaches to the acquisition of knowledge and cognitive skills. As suggested by an interview, the game designers are fully aware of this discussion:

“If you consider it structurally, then the problem is that an… an interpretation or a good quote is a subjective consideration, which is very difficult to quantify and operationalise. And that is what we try to do. Structurally it will always cause trouble. Because a pupil could think ’I could use this quote in this way’, and if we [Serious Games Interactive] didn’t think it that way, so to say. Or if the pupil has a particular qualification or a special background, which means that he/she is able to see certain things. And you could say that the pupil would get punished for this qualification if it doesn’t fit with the logic of the game.”

(interview with CEO Simon Egenfeldt-Nielsen, SGI 08/04/2008)

Another empirical finding we find worth mentioning is that the actual dialogue between the pupils working in pairs was reduced to pointing at the screen followed by short exclaims. These exclaims would be ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘pick that one’, concerning the dialogue text on which the pupils were to take a stand as they were playing the journalist role. Furthermore, the dialogue between pupils and teacher was mostly reduced to questions about strategies of the journalist role or technical problems. The rich amount of text in dialogues between the journalist and the informants of a mission made the pupils attention cling to the screen as they had to read the text before being able to make a choice.

4. Educational goals versus game elements

In this section, we wish to discuss the discursive modes that are represented in the structural composition of the quote system and the article template. As the empirical findings suggest, the pupils’ learning experience was closely linked with the game representations for selecting quotes and editing the article. Furthermore, the pupils’ lack of control of the composition made it impossible for them to express their own interpretations of what they had grasped as relevant information from the game missions.

In summary, both teachers and pupils’ questioned the lack of a more engaging and self-dependent form of participation in the game, which could involve actual writing –in contrast to mere imitation of journalistic writing. According to the teacher, this would allow the pupils to “think for themselves’”. Based upon the current game design, it is questionable whether the article template and the quote system is able to support critical thinking as it is mainly the game system that decide for the pupils. This point towards a gap between the teacher’s and the pupils’/players’ understanding of critical thinking on one side, and the game designer's promises of critical thinking as one of the educational goals of the game on the other side.

When analyzing GC: P from a multimodal discourse analytical perspective, there appears to be a discrepancy between the “learning discourse” of the game and the actual design stratas of the game (Kress 2001). Thus, the educational goals of the game states that pupil should be able to learn about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whereas the design is mainly centred on the game elements and game goals, which allow pupils/players to learn and act as a journalist. According to the response from teachers and pupils, the journalist role seems to be stealing the focus from the content of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This discrepancy is supported by the “reward” system of the game, which allows pupils to score points that measure the “trust” of the Israelis and Palestinians.

Furthermore, the game representations raise certain expectations among the pupils, which influence the affordances of the perceived signs within the game environment. Following Burn and Carr’s analytical model described earlier, we will argue that the 3D aesthetics of the role-playing/adventure game genre (representational motivation) promises inquiry-based exploration and challenge within the game world (ludic motivation) (Burn 2003, Dewey 1916). The representational motivations are further linked with the genre-specific expectations (communal motivation) raised by the game design as it both refers to the practices of real-life news journalists and the pupils’ familiarity with video games as such. However, the players’ choices within the game (i.e. having dialogues with different characters, getting qusotes, and creating articles) are basically founded upon the logics of multiple choice. Thus, playing the game creates a discrepancy between the representational/communal motivations and the ludic motivations of the game. This discrepancy was a recurring theme in the post-game interviews, where the pupils were disappointed that they could not produce their own articles – which would fulfil their expectations toward the role of a “journalist”. Thus, the pupils were only able to imitate the process of “writing an article”.

From the game designer’s perspective, this discrepancy makes sense, since, as the quote mentioned in section above illustrates, it is very hard to quantify the “news value” of a quote in a meaningful way. Thus, the individual pupil found it difficult to understand the premises for this quantitative form of evaluation as it is not backed by any arguments or explanations. In this empirical study, it seemed that the pupils’ comprehension of their game experience was mainly focused on: 1) the logic of the game system’s evaluation of the quotes, 2) whether a point-of-view represents one or the other stance, and/or 3) trying to figure out the cohesion between the quotes. However, instead of promoting critical thinking, the actual process of composing the article ends up being a drill-and-practice exercise, where the pupils simply click through the different quotes.

5. Discussion

The aim of this paper is to open a crucial discussion about the discrepancy between the intentions of educational game designs and realised educational goals. Unfortunately, the empirical aspects of this problem seems to be somewhat neglected among educational games researchers, who prefer to spend time discussing exciting new theories or design details within the safe environment of their separate “ghettos”. In order to provide a common ground for this discussion within and across these different ghettos, we propose that Barth’s/Klabbers’ meta-theoretical framework can be used to understand and compare how the knowledge aspects of educational games and educational gaming in terms of assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Barth 2002, Klabbers 2006, Hanghøj in press).

In our pilot study of GC:P, we found that there was a **clear discrepancy between** educational game elements versus educational goals**, or between “means” and “ends”** as Dewey would term it (Dewey 1916). This leads to a broader discussion on whether it is meaningful to use computers for evaluating learning processes. If we look at what areas in which educational games have been commercially successful (i.e. the military, health care, disaster prevention, management, and financial simulations), it seems obvious that video games offer a relevant way of evaluating learning that occurs within closed systems, and where the learning goals are related directly to understanding this system (Klabbers 2006). For more context-dependent learning goals, such as being able to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in critical perspective, it is questionable whether a computer may be able to evaluate pupils’ complex learning experiences in a meaningful way. Still, feedback through continual evaluation of a player’s actions is one of the basic tenets of almost any theory on video games and learning (Gee 2003). Thus, we need further analysis on how or whether the computerised systems of educational computer games should be able to provide this feedback.

GC:P is a game that promises to teach pupils critical thinking. One can ask whether it is possible for pupils to learn critical thinking without having to actively reflect and question their own knowledge and experience (Dewey, 1916). Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the limited dialogue between pupils playing GC:P in pairs are able to realise the well-documented potential of “shared inquiry” through pupils (and teachers’) “exploratory talk” (Wegerif, 2007). Returning to our meta-theoretical framework, we will argue that if an educational game **aims to foster critical thinking**, then this **aim** will determine what kind of assertions, modes and representation and learning activities that should be embedded in the game design. In the case of GC:P, it seems unlikely that it is possible to teach and learn critical thinking merely by letting pupils interact with the game environment without actively producing meaningful utterances – i.e. through relevant forms of speaking or writing. On the other hand, we should not rule out the possibility of designing an educational computer game, which is able to combine game activities with pupils’ opportunities for mutual self-expression and evaluation through spoken or written forms of communication. Theoretically, this could improve the ability of an educational computer game design to afford pupils’ critical inquiry and bridge the discrepancy between educational means and ends.

#### First, a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life ------ even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact---T debates also solve any possible turn

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there **must** be a difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate **cannot produce effective decisions** without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a **particular question** and identification of a line **demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in **unfocused deliberation** and **poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the **failure of** the United States **Congress** to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but **without a *focus*** for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without finding points of clarity or** potential **solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. But if a ***precise* question** is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more **profitable** area of **discussion** is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which **facilitates** **effective decision making** by directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an **interesting discussion** but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "**Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword**" is debatable, yet **fails to provide** much **basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that **good debates** cannot occur **over** competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates **may be** very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second, political simulations in a game-setting are good for education and decision-making ----- Defined rules, a stable topic, and institutional role playing are key

Lantis 8 (Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the

International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, “The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature”, <http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature_sample.pdf>**)**

**Simulations**, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring **abstract concepts to life**. They provide students with a real or imaginary environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to enable students to **actively experience**, rather than read or hear about, the “constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players” (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, “Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar.” Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like “Crisis,” “Grand Strategy,” “ICONS,” and “SALT III.” More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that **games are structured systems of competitive play** with **specific defined endpoints** or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but contain **specific structures or rules** that dictate **what it means to “win**” the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008) A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play’s less “goal oriented” focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student’s personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the **international studies classroom** (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around **specific educational objectives**, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor’s educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to **enhanced student interest** in the topic, the development of **empathy**, and **acquisition and retention** of **knowledge**.

#### Third, produces Meaning – it’s only possible within an arbitrary system of rules – their criticism amounts to speaking from nowhere.

Rameakers 1 (Stefan, Centre for Philosophy of Education U of Leuven, “Teaching to lie and obey: Nietzsche and Education.” Journal of philosophy and education. 35.2, EBSCO) jl

Much as one values Nietzsche for his cultural criticism and for his culturally innovative ideas, it would be a mistake to overlook the importance he attaches to obedience. Johnston argues that one cannot infer an anarchistic account of education from Nietzsches writings because of his emphasis on obedience and discipline in the primary school. However, Johnston fails to give obedience its rightful place. for Nietzsche's account of morality (particularly in Beyond Good and Evil and more specifically in the chapter "The Natural History of Morals') shows the **obedience** is not just about keeping pupils in line, but **means obedience to cultural and historical rules**, and as such is a moral imperative for all humankind. **The most important thing about every system of morals** for Nietzsche **is** that **it is a** 'long constraint’ a **'tyranny of arbitrary laws'.** For such cultural and historical phenomena as virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality, philosophy, politics, and so on **the creative act requires not absolute freedom or spontaneous unconstrained development but subordination to what is or at least appears to be 'arbitrary'.** It entails a long bondage of the spirit. The singular fact remains...that every of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary laws, and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is 'nature' and 'natural'-and not laisser-aller! The nature of morality inspires us to **stay far from an excessive freedom and cultivates the need for restricted horizons**. This narrowing of perspective is for Nietzsche **a condition of life and growth**. It is interesting to see how this is prefigured in Nietzsche’s second Unfashionable Observation (On the Utility and Liability of History for Life). The culture for what he there calls 'the historical sickness', i.e. an excess of history which attacks the shaping power of life and no longer understands how to utilise the past as a powerful source of nourishment, is (among others) the ahistorical: 'the art and power to be able to forget and to enclose oneself in a limited horizon'. Human beings cannot live with a belief in something lasting and eternal. **Subordination to the rules** of a system of morality **should not be understood as a deplorable restriction of an individual's possibilities and creative freedom**; on the contrary, **it** **is the necessary determination of limitation of the conditions under which anything can be conceived as possible**. **Only from** within a particular and **arbitrary framework can freedom itself be interpreted as freedom.** In other words, Nietzsche points to the necessity of being embedded in a particular cultural and historical frame. The pervasiveness of this embeddedness can be shown in at least four aspects of Nietzsche's writings. First, in his critique of morality Nietzsche realises all too well that it is impossible to criticise a system of morals from outside, as a view from nowhere. Instead, a particular concretisation is required. Beyond Good and Evil may very well, as a prelude to a philosophy of the future, excite dreams about unlooked-for horizons and unknown possibilities. IN The Genealogy of Morals, however, written by Nietzsche as further elaboration of elucidation of the same themes, he explicitly states that Beyond Good and Evil does not imply going beyond good and bad. Criticising a system of morals inevitably means judging from a particular point of view.

#### Fourth, forces Evolution – only our interpretation forces debaters to use and exploit system of rules. This is necessary to function in society, where we have to obey the rules and work with others.

Rameakers 1 (Stefan, Centre for Philosophy of Education U of Leuven, “Teaching to lie and obey: Nietzsche and Education.” Journal of philosophy and education. 35.2, EBSCO) jl

In view of the importance Nietzsche attaches to obedience to being embedded, one should not be surprised that he considers initiating the child into a particular constellation of arbitrary laws to be a natural part of her education. For the child, education means, at least in the early stags, being subordinated to a particular view of what is worth living for, and being introduced into a system of beliefs. Education consists in teaching the child to see and to value particular things, to handle a perspective: to lie. The argument goes even further. In view of Nietzsche's perspective, not teaching him to lie is educationally speaking not even an option: the child makes himself familiar with a perspective he cannot ignore since **this is the precondition for making sense of anything and exploring the unfamiliar**. Put differently, because of the necessity of being embedded a human being is moulded into a particular shape that he cannot do without. My understanding of Nietzsche is consequently at variance with any understanding which argues for a radical individualism and takes the individual to be the point of reference of all values and truths Johnston 35 for example tilts the scales too strongly toward the individual as a self-affirming autonomous agent and hence disregards the epistemologically and ethically constitutive importance of the individual's embeddedness for what she affirms as true and valuable. He even claims that the individual put forward by Nietzsche is the antithesis of the social realm. For Nietzsche, Johnton writes, 'there is no question of a reconcilation between the realms of the individual and the social'. 36 Referring to Dewey, he makes it look as if the Nietzschean individual can withdraw herself form social embeddedness since she apparently has no need to refer her own action to that of others. 37 Adopting a thoroughly Nietzschean stand on education therefore requires, in Johnston's opinion, a break with education conceived as a matter of 'making familiar with' and of being initiated into a particular cultural inheritance, that is a a matter of socialisation in this rich sense In consequence education becomes essentially self-education.

### 1NC

#### Their vision of changing power relationships only serves to liberate the human mind --- it doesn’t mean they actually replace those--- advances in orientation recycle the same utopian ideals of progressivism

Ophuls ’11 - former member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University (Ophuls, William. “Plato's Revenge: Politics in the Age of Ecology.” 19 August 2011. P. 1-9)

From this perspective, the rise of civilization constitutes a Faustian bargain or even a tragic fall from primal grace. When human beings abandoned the ecological niche in which they had evolved, they left a state of natural plenitude, however rough, for a life of toil in ﬁeld and mine. They became more numerous and prosperous but less healthy. 4 The technological means that they used to enrich themselves also harmed nature and turned war from a blood sport into a vehicle for conquest or extermination. Liberty was replaced by authority, equality by hierarchy, and fraternity by disunity. The many, who had once lived in small bands as kinsmen and equals, became subject to the few — to the emperors, kings, and tyrants who expropriated the wealth they produced. Natural religion gave way to organized religion, whose priests, rites, and doctrines served mostly the oppressors ’ interests, even as they gave some solace to the estranged denizens of the ancient cities. In short, the indisputable advantages of civilization were purchased at a high price. 5 Much of this was apparent to the philosophers and states- men who created the modern world, but their diagnosis of the disease — and therefore their proposed treatment — was ﬂawed. They sought to cure two of the ﬁve great ills (economic inequality and political oppression) by intensifying two others — ecological exploitation and military aggression. As a result, the modern age is marked by the ethos of the conquis- tador. Scientists master nature in their laboratories so that engineers can build arsenals and factories, manufacturers can make arms and goods, and soldiers and merchants can domi- nate the lands and markets of the world. These thinkers were driven by a quest for power — for dominion over nature, which would foster dominion over the world. But as Lord Acton famously said, power corrupts, and the more absolute the power, the worse the corruption. Indeed, power seems to drive men and women mad, with hubris being the worst symptom of the disease. The response of the Enlightenment philosophes to the ﬁfth great ill was equally problematic. They set about liberating men and women from clerical religion because they detested the venality, inquisitorial zeal, and reactionary politics of the established church, and they succeeded all too well in crushing Voltaire ’ s inf â me . When the babe of morality was thrown out with the bathwater of superstition, the consequence was a process of demoralization that began slowly but has now become a rout. This demoralization has three aspects — the corruption of morals and mores, the undermining of morale, and the spread- ing of confusion — and has resulted in the loss of almost all sense of honor, duty, and responsibility. Solidarity, too, has eroded, as individuals and groups engage in a **winner-take-all struggle** for power and wealth. However glutted with goods people in rich countries may be, they feel that they are subject to a vast, impersonal, out-of-control system that gives them the vote, that mostly abides by juridical rules, but that denies them real liberty and equality. Fraternity is not even an issue. Last but not least, because God is dead and only instrumental reason counts, all authority and orientation have been over- thrown — so men and women have lost not only their intellectual and spiritual bearings but even the means by which to take them. The ﬁ ve great ills of civilization therefore have become evils that threaten the continued existence of human society. Eco- logical exploitation has degenerated into the systematic and ruthless abuse of nature, causing an accelerated degra dation and depletion of our natural milieu. We ourselves have begun to suffer certain inconveniences, and our grandchildren stand to inherit a poisoned and impoverished planet. Indeed, as the age of petroleum draws to a close, the material basis for an advanced technological culture capable of supporting billions of people in sprawling megacities is by no means assured. Similarly, military aggression has escalated **into potential [omnicide**] holocaust, as Weapons of Mass Destruction are ever more widely disseminated. And wars are no longer fought by brave warriors and wily generals who meet face to face on a battle- ﬁeld but by military bureaucrats and technicians who risk nothing as they rain electronic death on remotely seen enemies — or unarmed innocents. In the same way, our economic system has vastly ampliﬁ ed the scope and scale of economic inequality. Despite a general rise in material well-being, wealth is radically maldistributed, and billions of people continue to live in destitution and misery. In addition, the rich command resources unimaginable to ancient kings, so the rod by which deprivation is measured has grown enormously. Nor has political oppression vanished. Even in states where the principle of liberty is well established, the burden of bureaucratic regulation becomes ever more minute, all encom- passing, and suffocating. Traditional liberties are being eroded in the name of expediency in efforts to defend national security and ﬁ ght terrorism, crime, drugs, and tax evasion. A sphere of privacy hardly exists anymore. Meanwhile, democracy is mostly a sham: either money rules, or remote policy elites in cahoots with powerful economic interests make all the important decisions. Lastly, spiritual malaise is pandemic. As a result, demo- ralized individuals must struggle to keep their psychic footing. Many resort to diseased methods of coping, not only physical addiction to drugs, alcohol, and tobacco but also psychological addiction to eating, entertainment, gambling, pornography, sex, shopping, and sports. Many simply cannot cope. The armies of social workers and psychotherapists may help a handful of individuals, but they can do little to save society, which becomes fertile ground for every form of mania. This demoralization was never intended by the thinkers who created the modern world. Believing as they did (and not without reason) that organized religion was an almost unmiti- gated evil, they sought to liberate us from religious politics — from the interference of an established church in the public affairs of the state and the private affairs of the individual. Thanks to their efforts, we in the West are no longer subject to clerical oppression or to a despotic form of spirituality, for which we must be eternally grateful. But we have paid a steep price for this liberation. Indeed, far from creating a rational utopia, banishing superstition and exalting reason have created a spiritual void that has been ﬁ lled by absurd and dangerous political, social, and economic ideologies that have often proven to be as patho- logical in their historical consequences as the dogmatic religions of old. In retrospect, it may seem surprising that the philosophes had so few qualms about crushing the established church, one of the pillars of the existing social order. But they believed that traditional religion was dispensable precisely because they were certain that human reason, once liberated from theology, would soon discover the moral order implicit within the cosmos — an order to which men and women, being reasonable beings, would naturally and willingly accede. That did not happen. The secularization promoted by the Enlightenment took on a logic and momentum of its own. Rationalism displaced reason, so the only permissible natural laws were mechanical, not moral. Human beings also turned out to be far less reasonable and **much more irrational** than these thinkers assumed. The triumph of secularism has had consequences that are devastating in the political sphere. A purely rational and material politics — a politics without a moral code or a vision of the good life or a sense of the sacred — is a contradiction in terms. As Aristotle pointed out, no polity can long exist as “ a mere alliance ” of self-interested individuals. 6 What makes a political community cohere is what Aristotle called “ a rule of life ” — that is, a shared ethos. 7 But the rule of life of modern politics is that we shall have no positive rules, only negative ones that keep us from harming others but that otherwise leave us at liberty. The citizens themselves must sustain community through social institutions — churches, schools, voluntary associations, infor- mal networks — that inculcate a shared ethos and foster a sense of common destiny. In other words, the indispensable linchpin of the modern state is civil society, for it alone supplies the cohesion that a liberal polity lacks. Unfortunately, the process of demoralization described above has effectively destroyed the morals, mores, and morale of civil society. As a result, polity today is more and more a mere alliance of self-interested individuals who pursue their own private ends and who accept only minimal restraints on their actions. Liberty has become license, and the social basis of the modern, liberal state has eroded away. In effect, the project of modern politics has failed. When Hobbes took the radical step of severing politics from virtue and founding the polity on the self-interested individual, he started a movement that **liberated men and women** from subservience to king and bishop, but he ***also* set in motion** a **vicious circle of moral decay** that has all but overwhelmed civil society. The legal and bureaucratic machinery of government has grown larger and more oppressive in a mostly vain attempt to make up for social decline. We are being driven toward an administrative despotism that extinguishes both liberty and privacy because it is the most expedient way to deal with the moral breakdown caused by our basic political principles. It is bad enough that a secular and rational politics has destroyed its own foundation and now seems bent on creating a Leviathan. What is even more dangerous is that casting men and women loose from their traditional cultural and religious moorings leaves them adrift in a meaningless cosmos, lacking clear metaphysical or practical answers to the basic problems of life. The resulting spiritual vertigo is responsible for much of the social and personal dysfunction mentioned above and also for the calamitous history of the twentieth century. Only a few artists, philosophers, and free spirits thrive on the radical openness of cultural nihilism. The average person hates it, and if people do not get satisfactory answers to the questions of life from their inherited culture, then they will seek them else- where. This explains the popular appeal of the fanatical ide- ologies that drenched the last century in blood (and of the religious fundamentalism that now threatens to do the same in this one). In reality, the Enlightenment did not so much abolish reli- gion as redirect the spiritual drive of the Judeo-Christian tradi- tion toward worldly ends. We moderns are just as religious as our premodern ancestors, but we have chosen to worship two savage gods — Moloch and Mammon. Those who worship Moloch turn politics into a **perverted religion**. They try to ﬁll the void caused by cultural nihilism with eschatological secular creeds **dedicated to achieving a utopian ideal** of social perfec- tion. Those who worship Mammon turn politics into a religion of the self. They try to fill the void by glutting themselves with pleasure, exalting their **own self-gratification into a moral principle** and exploiting the state for selﬁ sh ends. These are both false gods. Neither ideology nor self-indulgence can satisfy the spiritual needs of human beings or make them truly happy, and both tend toward destruction. Our secular, rational, amoral way of life is failing. Our cultural myth to the contrary notwithstanding, this way of life represents **not a ﬁnal progressive advance** of civilization to “ the end of history ” but an **intensiﬁcation** of civilization’s ***inherent* ﬂaws** that can **end only in tragedy**. We must reinvent civilization so that it once again rests on a moral foundation by discovering a new “ rule of life ” that moderates, rather than magniﬁ es, the ﬁve great ills. And we now have the means to do so. The epistemological and ontological revolution of the twentieth century that produced systems ecology, particle physics, and depth psychology reveals a moral order that is immanent within the scientiﬁc description of the universe. From this order — “ written on the tablets of eternity ” — we can derive principles that could form the basis for humane and prudent governance. In other words, we have rediscovered the kind of natural law that the philosophes envisioned. We now understand, better than our Enlightenment ancestors, the means by which we can actualize these principles without resurrecting the evils of organized religion. In this book, I begin by examining the role played by law in human society before showing that ecology, physics, and psychology all agree in pointing us toward a politics of consciousness dedicated to expanding human awareness rather than extending human dominion. Unless the means of civilization are soon directed to an end that is higher than the endless accumulation of wealth and power, then the very enterprise of civilization itself, not just our particular form of it, may not long survive.

#### And a transition to environmental authoritarianism’s coming now---solves extinction

Beeson 10, Mark Beeson, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The environment has become the defining public policy issue of the era. Not only will political responses to environmental challenges determine the health of the planet, but continuing environmental degradation may also affect political systems. This interaction is likely to be especially acute in parts of the world where environmental problems are most pressing and the state's ability to respond to such challenges is weakest. One possible consequence of environmental degradation is the development or consolidation of authoritarian rule as political elites come to privilege regime maintenance and internal stability over political liberalisation. Even efforts to mitigate the impact of, or respond to, environmental change may involve a decrease in individual liberty as governments seek to transform environmentally destructive behaviour. As a result, ‘environmental authoritarianism’ may become an increasingly common response to the destructive impacts of climate change in an age of diminished expectations.

#### Liberating agency is the root cause of all their impacts and extinction --- the aff can’t solve human defects

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The portrait of the psyche that emerges is cautionary. As much as contemporary humans would like to believe that we have transcended our evolutionary origins, our animal nature lives on within us — **in our genes and** in our **minds**. Witness the architecture of the human brain, in which the cerebral cortex enfolds a mammalian limbic system wrapped around a reptilian core. Hence, said Jung, Every civilized human being, however high his conscious develop- ment, is still an archaic man at the deeper levels of his psyche. Just as the human body connects us with the mammals and displays numerous vestiges of earlier evolutionary stages going back even to the reptilian age, so the human psyche is a product of evolution which, when followed back to its origins, shows countless archaic traits. 2 In effect, Jung concludes, a “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” dwells in all of us. Even the distinctively human part of our nature associated with the cortex is irredeemably Paleolithic. 3 As a consequence, men and women are constantly agitated by primordial drives and conﬂicting emotions that they only partly understand and struggle to control — and that they are usually not even aware of. Much is healthy and good in human beings, but we have propensities for sickness and evilthat must not be ignored. Anthropology supports this bleak assessment of the human psyche. With few exceptions, there are no harmless people, and the savage mind, whatever its virtues, is often prey to unconscious forces and raw emotions (and is therefore the author of savage behavior). A review of the anthropological literature reveals three seemingly universal tendencies of the human mind: we are **prone to superstition** and magical thinking, we are **predisposed to paranoia**, **and we project our own hostility onto others**. 4 In essence, says Melvin Konner, chronic fear pervades the psyche and drives human behavior. 5 Although the last word has yet to be spoken, there seems to be an emerging scientiﬁ c consensus: we humans are a volatile mix of animal, primal, and civil — a tangle of emotions and drives that all but guarantees inner and outer conﬂ icts. That human nature is partly animal nature is not entirely a bad thing. Instinct is necessary for a healthy psyche and a moral society. But for human beings to live peacefully in crowded civilizations, the more bestial and savage aspects of man ’ s nature have to be actively discouraged by society. Konner puts it more forcefully. Because of our fear-driven antisocial propensities, we humans are “ evil ” by nature and therefore **need a “ Torah, ” or** an equivalent **ethical code, to forestall the** war of all against all. 6 In practice, this means that mores are essential because they tip the balance between good and evil in human nature. Good ones turn fal- lible, passionate men and women into reasonably upright members of society, while bad ones turn them into feral menaces to society. This conclusion does not follow from theory alone; it has been empirically demonstrated. The social psychologist Stanley Milgram showed how simple it is to create little Adolf Eich- manns who obediently inﬂ ict severe pain on hapless experi- mental subjects. 7 In an even more frightening experiment, his colleague Philip Zimbardo contrived to convert ordinary, presumably decent students into punitive monsters. In the infamous Stanford prison experiment, student volunteers were randomly assigned to be either guards or prisoners. In a matter of days, the former turned harsh and sadistic, the latter cringing or rebellious, and the experiment had to be aborted to avert physical harm to the prisoners. 8 In effect, psychology has rediscovered what were once called “ the passions ” — the welter of conﬂicting and potentially **dangerous impulses and emotions** that lurk in every human breast and that threaten to erupt under the slightest provocation unless they are kept in check by personal character or social control. Recall the words of Burke: “ Society cannot exist unless a controlling power on will and appetite be placed some- where. ” The choice is between self-imposed “ moral chains ” or externally imposed “ fetters. ” In his Politics , Aristotle identiﬁ ed the essential political challenge: For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice . . . [because he] is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence, when devoid of virtue man is the most unholy and savage of animals. 9 When individuals gather in crowds, the challenge increases by orders of magnitude because fear, greed, and anger are contagious. As Gustave Le Bon pointed out long ago, crowds amplify every human defect and manifest many new ones of their own. “ The masses, ” said Jung, “ always incline to herd psychology, hence they are easily stampeded; and to mob psychology, hence their witless brutality and hysterical emo- tionalism. ” 10 Nietzsche was even more scathing: “ Insanity in individuals is something rare — but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. ” 11 The greatest Weapon of Mass Destruction on the planet is therefore the collective human ego. History teaches that the human capacity for evil is virtually unlimited. Unless wisdom and virtue are deployed to counteract ego ’ s potential for destruction, actual destruction is inevitable as men and women forget their better nature and become unholy and savage animals. This new yet old understanding of human nature is enough by itself to demolish modern hubris. Inﬁ nite social progress is as much of a chimera as inﬁ nite material progress. The “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” is what he is and will not be improved, only tamed. Indeed, at this point in human history, the essential task is forestalling racial suicide, not pursuing social perfection. To this cautionary portrait of human nature, we must now add the limits of human cognition. As has been shown, the human perceptual apparatus is a trickster. We are in touch not with reality but with a kind of shadow play **projected onto the screen of the psyche** **by** invisible deep structures. We have also seen that even the ﬁnest intellects struggle to comprehend complex, self-organizing systems, for nature does not make it easy for us to know reality. But the fault does not lie in nature. The human mind was simply not created to unravel the mys- teries of quantum mechanics or to comprehend the intricate dynamics of the global climate regime. It was instead cobbled together and then honed to perfection by evolution for one speciﬁ c purpose — survival as hunter-gatherers on the African savannah. We are Jung ’ s “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” not just emotionally but also cognitively. We are hardwired to perceive in certain ways and not in others. Above all, human cognition is “ designed ” for concrete perception, so primal peoples are masters of what anthropolo- gist Claude L é vi-Strauss called “ the sciences of the concrete. ” 12 This is by no means an inferior mode of thought. The savage is not, as we tend to think, a mere captive of strange fancies and outlandish beliefs. He is actually more of an empiricist than the physicist because he perceives his world directly and immediately whereas the latter ﬁ lters nature through an elabo- rate intellectual apparatus made up of mathematical, theoreti- cal, and technological lenses. So the abstraction associated with literacy, civilization, and, above all, scientiﬁ c investiga- tion is not natural but acquired — and only with great difﬁ culty after years of schooling. Even schooling cannot entirely eradicate the innate pro- pensity for concreteness in the human mind. For instance, **we daily commit the** epistemological sin **of** reiﬁcation — regarding abstractions or ideas, such as energy or the market, as if they were somehow as real as rocks and trees rather than constructs that help us understand complex phenomena. Likewise, our opinions have a tendency to become “ set in concrete, ” resist- ing all evidence to the contrary. 13 But perhaps the most egregious instance of what Whitehead called “ the fallacy of misplaced concreteness ” is that so many otherwise sane human beings believe in the absolute, literal truth of the manifestly mythological accounts contained in various scriptures — refusing to accept archeological and historical evidence to the contrary or even to entertain the possibility that these accounts could be ﬁngers pointing at the ineffable rather than expressions of concrete truth. 14 Sadly, many, if not most, human beings are not capable of rising very far above Piaget ’ s concrete operational stage of cognition. 15 Hence they cannot be said truly to comprehend the social and physical reality of life in complex civilizations — a life far removed from the comparatively simple and concrete existence of the hunter-gatherer, which centered on day-to-day survival amid an intimate circle of kinsmen and friends. As a corollary, the untutored human mind focuses on the present and the dramatic. The imperative of survival on the savannah made us sensitive to immediate or striking dangers — but comparatively oblivious to long-term trends, risks, and consequences, especially ones that are inconspicuous. Our attention is not grabbed by the creeping destruction of habitat, the imperceptible extinction of species, the continual accumu- lation of pollutants, the gradual loss of topsoil, the steady depletion of aquifers, and the like. Rather, we tend to ﬁ xate on dramatic symptoms (such as the occasional major oil spill) while ignoring the far greater long-term threat to ecosystems posed by quotidian events (such as the daily dribble of petro- chemicals from a multiplicity of sources, which is far greater and much more damaging over the long term). Unfortunately, dribbles are not the stuff of melodrama and so tend not to register strongly, even when brought to our attention by the media. So it takes a crisis to thrust stealthy perils into full awareness. Unfortunately, says biologist Richard Dawkins, the human brain was simply not built to understand slow, cumulative processes like evolutionary or ecological change, which demand an acute sensitivity to the long-term consequences of small changes. 16 Since long-term observation and planning were not critical for our early survival, these mental attributes were not reinforced by evolutionary selection. Ecology and its implications are therefore poorly understood, even by the informed public. More generally, the human mind ’ s inability to escape the clutches of the present leads to the habitual, shortsighted pursuit of current advantage to the detriment of future well-being. In addition, the survival imperative endowed us with a host of cognitive shortcuts — unconscious mental algorithms that may have been essential on the savannah but that must be consciously set aside if we humans are to live sanely in civiliza- tion. For example, the human mind tends to be quick to decide. Like any animal, we are emotionally wired for ﬁ ght or ﬂ ight, which means that our savage minds are also cognitively wired to jump to conclusions. When early humans spotted a tan shape lurking in the elephant grass, the minds that decided “ lion ” soonest had the best chance to pass their genes down to posterity. The human mind is also dualistic, so it is constrained, if not compelled, to choose one pole or the other — ﬁ ght or ﬂ ight, black or white, right or wrong — not the middle ground. This has been experimentally demonstrated at the perceptual level: when humans look at a classical optical illusion, they see either the lady or the vase, never both at once. In other words, the human mind naturally dichotomizes, creating the common oppositions of “ good ” and “ bad, ” “ us ” versus “ them, ” the “ two sides ” of any issue, “ left ” against “ right ” in politics, and so on. Unfortunately, as F. Scott Fitzgerald noted, it takes a ﬁ rst-rate intelligence to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still continue to function, so untutored minds readily afﬁx themselves to one of the poles and oppose the other. **This explains** the **perennial conﬂict** between believers and inﬁdels that has occasioned untold historical misery.

#### The alternative is paideia – it is an acceptance of a strong government is the only way out to prevent totalitarianism and curb human destruction of the environment

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Politeia is the means for realizing the ends of therapeia and paideia . Wisdom and virtue do not arise spontaneously in human beings, especially those who reside in complex civiliza- tions, so morality must be institutionalized and inculcated by a polity dedicated to fostering and upholding society ’ s norms and mores. The polity’s role is to govern — to direct affairs in a way that citizens are encouraged to **follow a moral code** or are swiftly checked when they fail to do so. (All the rest of what we call politics is politicking, policing, and administra- tion.) Provided that the code reﬂ ects an elevated ideal, such as excellence or wisdom, the result will be a rule of life that is relatively sane and humane. We live at a historical juncture that will challenge govern- ments as never before. Liberal society owes its existence to the bubble of ecological afﬂuence fueled by the “ discovery ” of the New World and the exploitation of the stored solar energy in fossil fuels. 2 Those who have grown up in afﬂ uent societies have therefore enjoyed unprecedented opportunities and freedoms, as well as levels of comfort and plenty all but unimaginable to our ancestors. But the impending return of ecological scarcity means that the expectations and aspirations of billions of indi- viduals cannot be met and that individual wants will increasingly be subordinated to collective needs. Governments now confront the **Herculean task** **of effecting an epochal** economic, social, and political transition from the industrial age to the age of ecology. The question is whether this can be achieved without lapsing into totalitarian tyranny or religious despotism. To escape such a fate will require us to break decisively with our habitual response to societal problems: passing laws that give governments ever more administrative power. The extraor- dinary nature of the challenge exposes us to the eternal and inescapable dilemma of politics in a particularly acute form. As Lord Acton observed, because power inevitably corrupts, no can be entrusted with it: “ The danger is not that a particular class is unﬁ t to govern. Every class is unﬁ t to govern. ” 3 The maxim “ That government is best which governs least ” follows as a matter of course. As John Stuart Mill says in concluding On Liberty , A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activities and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs. 4 So the proper function of government **is to facilitate, not dominate**; to **make the rules, not play the game**. By its nature, big government — whoever exercises power and whatever their intentions — is bound to be less responsive or efﬁ cient than small. In addition, any problems that emerge quickly become the rationale for further extensions of administrative power. But the more the government intrudes into the life of the citi- zenry, the more burdensome and expensive it becomes. More important, because power corrupts, it will inevitably tend to become overbearing as well. Because men and women have a surfeit of passion and a deﬁ cit of reason, a substantial degree of governance is indis- pensable for civilized life. It alone can constrain the one and supply the other. So government is a necessary evil — and the more it departs from what is truly indispensable, the greater the evil. Our aim must therefore be to construct a political regime that is sufﬁ cient to the desired end without exceeding what is strictly necessary. Instituting a necessary evil is not for the squeamish, but we shirk the task at our peril. Pascal likened political philosophy to “ lay[ing] down rules for an insane asylum. ” 5 The metaphor is apt. At best, even in comparatively well-ordered polities, political life is a kind of Bedlam characterized by shared delusion, cold-blooded self-seeking, and an aggressive will to power. At worst, it becomes a barely sublimated civil war one step removed from a Hobbesian state of nature. And Pope to the contrary notwithstanding, good rules are indeed necessary for a good politics lest we turn into a well-administered con- centration camp. Depending on the rules and the ways in which the rules are administered, the asylum will be more or less peaceful, more or less benign, and more or less conducive to individual sanity and welfare. Politics is not everywhere and always an unmitigated evil. As Aristotle and others point out, participation in politics can enhance the self-development of individuals. What is too often forgotten, however, is that only small, simple, face-to- face societies permit genuine participation. In the wrong set- ting — a society that is large, complex, or divided — **participatory politics** is likely to become what Plato said it was: an ignorant and impassioned mob **ﬁghting over the tiller of the ship** of state, with potentially disastrous consequences. The essen- tial task is therefore to foster a social and economic setting conducive to a politics that is sane, humane, participatory, and ecological. Nothing I say here should be construed as approving a dictatorial remaking of our civilization. We do not need a Lenin or even an Ataturk. We require a new moral, legal, and political order that cannot be imposed from the top down but that must instead percolate up as the consequence of an intel- lectual and moral reformation. The aim of this reformation should be to create the kind of society desired by Burke and Taine — a **self-regulating society** in which individuals bind themselves with moral chains and thereby become their own constables. To return to the theme of the noble lie, the ideal animating the machinery of government, not the machinery itself, con- stitutes a polity. Institutions do not create an ethos: witness the bootless attempts in the postcolonial era to graft the trap- pings of representative democracy onto traditional societies for whom democracy and liberty are alien ideals. The reverse is actually true: those who possess an ethos will naturally establish institutions that reﬂect it. Politics is not about elections, ofﬁces, or laws. It is about the deﬁnition of reality: what epistemology, ontology, and ethic shall constitute our rule of life? It is about the master metaphor that frames the manner of thought and the character of institutions at lower levels. At the heart of any political battle — from the general direction of society to particular policy issues — is a ﬁ ght to make a particular idea prevail: the invisible hand or the class struggle, a right to life or freedom of choice? 6 In consequence, said David Hume, it is always opinion that governs: nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few. . . . When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall ﬁ nd, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. 7 The French jurist J. M. A. Servan made the same point more cynically: A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas. . . . [T]his link is all the stronger in that we do not know what it is made of. 8 This ancient problem was adumbrated by Plato in The Republic and has been much studied in modern times by soci- ologists of knowledge: the human mind produces opinions that may have only a passing resemblance to reality. In the political arena, the problem manifests as Karl Marx ’ s “ false consciousness. ” On one side, a majority is unskilled in think- ing but hungry for meaning, and on the other, a smaller minor- ity is skilled at mental manipulation and hungry for power. The latter normally succeeds in imposing its ideas on the former — “ What luck for rulers that men do not think, ” said Adolf Hitler 9 — and these ideas, backed up as necessary by the gendarmerie and secret police, constitute the mainstay of any regime. The political dramas that occupy our newspapers and television screens **are** therefore largely **irrelevant**. As long as the basic metaphor remains the same, it is business as usual, no matter who wins elections or what policies are adopted. However, let one metaphor displace another, and “ reality ” shifts accordingly. According to Archibald MacLeish, “ A world ends when its metaphor has died. ” 10 When the consent of the governed supplanted the divine right of kings as master metaphor, the consequence was a radically new and different political order. The usual understanding of false consciousness, especially among Marxists, is that the falsity is due to cynical political manipulation combined with deliberate intellectual obfusca- tion, which leads the masses to be cunningly imprisoned in a set of beliefs that serve the interests of the ruling class. The usual solution proposed by modern thinkers is therefore sci- entiﬁ c. Science — whether the laws of dialectical materialism that govern the unfolding of human history, the best means of fostering economic growth, or the right way to feed babies — will provide objectively truthful answers to all questions and thereby liberate us from false consciousness once and for all. But there is no such thing as objectively true consciousness. Science may indeed provide us with true opinion concerning certain aspects of human nature and the natural world so that we can choose a rule of life that does not ﬂ out reality. But it cannot tell us what reality ultimately is, and it cannot choose the rule for us. **Everything** depends on the master metaphor we use to construct reality. The image of the machine leads to one kind of society — individualistic, acquisitive, exploitative — whereas the image of Gaia points in a very different direction. Again, we come face to face with the enormous power and reach of metaphor. It can liberate us, or it can enclose us in a mental prison — either one of our own making or one imposed on us by powerful others. The essential political struggle of our time is **not to pass laws that reduce pollution and conserve energy** so that the machine can keep running until it self-destructs, taking human- ity along with it. Instead, it is to ﬁght to make ecology the master science and Gaia the ruling metaphor — to abandon an ignoble lie and embrace a nobler new ﬁction that offers the means of long-term survival and the prospect of a further advance in civilization. This conclusion that a new ﬁ ction is the key to political change is supported by systems analysis. As Donella H. Meadows points out, the most effective leverage point for changing a system ’ s behavior is its fundamental mind set or paradigm, for this determines its goals, structure, and rules. 11 Unfortunately, this is also where resistance to change is ﬁ ercest. The required strategy of change, says Meadows, is to expose the anomalies, contradictions, and failures of the old paradigm while at the same time offering a new and better one. 12 The essence of the politeia that follows from this new ﬁ ction has already been stated. It is a politics of consciousness grounded in ecology and dedicated to inner cultivation instead of outer conquest. But what does this imply? The sages, prophets, poets, and philosophers who have gone against the grain of civilization by urging men and women to pursue wisdom and virtue instead of wealth and power have generally agreed on the means necessary to this end. They all envisioned a way of living that is materially and institutionally simple but culturally and spiritually rich — and therefore more generally free, egalitarian, and fraternal than life in complex societies devoted to continuous accumula- tion and expansion. The case for material and institutional simplicity takes several forms. The negative argument is that as societies grow larger and more complex, self-regulation breaks down, so they develop chronic and intractable problems. Politicians respond with laws and regulations that purport to be solutions. But when society has reached a certain level of complexity, solu- tions are either far from obvious or too painful to implement or even contemplate. Leaders resort to simplistic, merely expedient “ reforms ” that fail to solve the old problems and generate new ones that then require stronger measures. As a consequence, government grows ﬁ rst powerful, then intrusive, and ﬁ nally overbearing or even tyrannical, and the people themselves are corrupted and made dependent. Under such conditions, liberty decays, equality declines, and fraternity fades, often dramatically. The solution is for men and women to live in relatively small and simple societies that encourage them to be upright and independent, that preserve them from oppression, that keep them on a relatively equal footing with their fellow citizens, and that allow them to participate mean- ingfully in civic life. The positive argument is that men and women should live close to the earth and to each other in relatively simple and stable small communities because this is what the archetypal needs of the “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” require. A simpler and more natural existence will tend to maximize an individual ’ s chances of enjoying the good life — deﬁ ned as a way of living that is ﬁ lled with nature, beauty, family, friendship, leisure, education, and, for those inclined to it, philosophy in the Platonic sense of personal and spiritual self-development. These things, not material goods, bring true felicity. It follows that the aim of economic life must be sufﬁ ciency, which supports such felicity — not great wealth, which is its enemy. Sufﬁ ciency is also important for political reasons. Besides forestalling the growth of tyranny, a simple economy is relatively transparent, so individuals can see their own inter- ests as well as the common interest and act on them. Sufﬁ - ciency combined with ample opportunity for self-development also reconciles the tension between equality and excellence. If each human being attains his or her unique excellence and is recognized by others for having done so, then the best can in principle rule without creating either dependency or resent- ment among the ruled. This brief overview touches on important issues that are further addressed below, but we must ﬁ rst respond to the objection that a small-is-beautiful prescription for political salvation is utterly utopian and therefore not worthy of being taken seriously. In fact, what has always been philosophically commendable is about to become practically obligatory. The manifold pressures of ecological scarcity will soon compel us to live in smaller, simpler communities that are closer to the land than the megacities of industrial civilization. In the next few decades, well before we have completely exhausted the capital stocks of fossil fuels and mineral ores on which the current industrial order depends, matter and energy will become increasingly scarce and expensive. If deployed skill- fully and in a timely manner, technology can shape and moder- ate this inexorable trend, but it **cannot forestall it**. Our future way of life will of necessity be more simple, frugal, local, agricultural, diversiﬁ ed, and decentralized than at present. Our task must be to make a virtue of this necessity. When we recognize its necessity, we shall see that a simpler way of life might indeed be more virtuous and happy than the one we now believe represents the acme of human progress. In the ﬁrst place, industrial civilization has become too complex and interlinked for its own good. As Joseph Tainter points out, an excess of complexity, usually aggravated by other factors, has spelled the downfall of previous civilizations. 13 The costs of increasing complexity grow disproportionately until they eventually reach a point of diminishing or even declining returns. The civilization therefore has to run harder and harder to make further progress or even to stay in the same place. In addition, a civilization already stressed by the high costs of complexity may **no longer be resilient** enough to respond to further challenges. It risks a cascade of failure should a critical link fail for whatever reason. The interconnected insti- tutions of a highly complex society are like mountain climbers tied to one rope with no belay: **the fall of one can trigger the death of all**. For example, the world ﬁ nancial system experi- ences periodic crises when the failure of one bank brings down a host of counterparties. Similarly, a sudden or signiﬁ cant increase in the price of a critical commodity, such as petro- leum, can choke an industrial superstructure predicated on cheap and abundant energy. The further danger is that such a crisis can trigger psychological panic and social pandemo- nium. In short, the higher we build the ediﬁ ce of civilization, the more vulnerable we become to catastrophe. A simpler, more resilient way of life would therefore be advisable on prudential grounds alone. But our primary concern here is politeia , and the political argument for cultural simplicity is that great size and complex- ity produce a debased politics. When a polity grows beyond certain bounds, oligarchy in the bad sense is inescapable, the burden of bureaucracy grows ever more stiﬂ ing, and genuine consent of the governed is practically unattainable. A vicious circle fostering ever greater centralized planning, administra- tive intervention, and political control takes over. If democracy survives at all, it will be a **token democracy** shadowed by the lurking menace of **mob rule**. In the United States today, for instance, a **tiny** circulating policy elite makes all the important decisions in ways that align the interests of government, ﬁ nance, and business. Since the system is “ democratic, ” the elite has to take into account the passions of the mob, which can erupt if its ox is palpably gored. So as long as the American ruling class provides the bread of afﬂuence and an entertaining media circus, it can do pretty much as it likes. Having long since outgrown the relatively simple conditions required to support its constitu- tional design, the United States has therefore **become an imperial polity** bearing no resemblance whatsoever to the original American republic. Such is the political price of great size and complexity. To cast the problem in more philosophical terms, let us turn to Jean-Jacques Rousseau ’ s On the Social Contract , which argues that the central task of politics is to uphold the “ general will. ” This is what any reasonable person, putting aside his or her prejudice and self-interest, would agree is in the public interest because it beneﬁ ts the community as a whole. Rousseau contrasts the general will with the “ will of all, ” which is the mere summation of all the private wills of the individuals composing the polity. The difference between the general will and the will of all is best seen through examples. If people are carrying a contagious disease, the general will may demand that they be quarantined in some fashion. We do not allow a Typhoid Mary to work in restaurants because preventing the spread of illness to the general population trumps her loss of liberty. Similarly, we do not permit individuals to urinate and defecate just anywhere. We oblige them to practice good hygiene by using sanitary facilities, both to prevent a public nuisance and to preserve public health. We also make immunization mandatory for schoolchildren because we know that the gain to society from herd immunity outweighs not only parental preference but even the slight risk of harm to any particular child. In this critical area of public health, we compel individuals to follow the general will rather than their private will because to do otherwise would produce a diseased will of all. In these cases, the difference between the general will and the will of all is clear, and the argument for the former is, to most people, compelling. However, this same dynamic applies at every level within the polity — albeit usually in a more atten- uated form that can make it hard to achieve or even discern the general will, especially in advance. As Rousseau points out, “ One always wants what is good for oneself, but one does not always see it. ” 14 Even where there is no evil intention but simply **the natural urge to fulﬁll individual desire**, people following their private will almost always create a will of all contrary to the general will. For example, the individual preference for private automo- biles leads to a host of public ills — trafﬁ c-choked and polluted cities that are friendlier to cars than people, thousands of dead and injured people every year, the threat of climate disruption, the loss of good farmland to suburban sprawl, foreign policy dilemmas or even wars, and so forth. Similarly, private demand for exotic woods causes the destruction of tropical rainforests, an ecological tragedy whose costs we all bear. Likewise, indi- viduals seeking longer life through state-of-the-art medical care threaten to bankrupt the public purse, to mention only the ﬁ scal cost of extended life spans. In other words, perfectly reasonable and legitimate private desires and actions aggregate into global outcomes that no reasonable person would want. Unless the general will is identiﬁ ed and upheld by the polity, ill-advised microdecisions motivated by private interest will add up to an unwanted or even ruinous macrodecision. The “ tragedy of the commons, ” the “ public-goods problem, ” the phenomenon of “ market failure, ” and a number of other dilemmas much studied by contemporary social sci- entists are instances of the general problem identiﬁ ed by Rous- seau. The same essential conﬂ ict occurs within each individual human being. We all know we would be healthier if we ate less and exercised more (the general will), but instead we indulge appetite (the private will) and cause an epidemic of obesity (the will of all). As a matter of both principle and practice, modern political economies are based explicitly on the will of all — that is, they are designed to satisfy private desire, not to achieve the public good. To put it the other way around, the public good has been redeﬁ ned as the outcome of the invisible hand of the economic and political marketplace. In fact, any attempt to uphold the commonweal is likely to be dismissed out of hand as special pleading or denounced as hostile to liberty. The practical outcome of modern political economy is almost bound to be what economist John Kenneth Galbraith called “ private afﬂ u- ence and public squalor ” — that is, a state in which individuals gratify their petty desires without regard to the unwanted or even destructive consequences of their private acts. 15 Worse yet, the reality of any marketplace is that partici- pants constantly strive to tip the invisible hand in their dir- ection, so the legislative process is likely to be subverted. As Rousseau put it, “ the basest interest brazenly adopts the sacred name of the public good . . . and iniquitous decrees whose only goal is the private interest are falsely passed under the name of laws. ” 16 The resulting will of all is therefore not pure but crooked. It has been bent to favor some interests over others. For Rousseau, the will of all is not primarily a practical problem to be solved but a moral failure to be overcome. When we follow our private will oblivious to or even in deﬁ ance of the general will, we injure society and degrade ourselves. His conclusion is expressed in stark terms by the epigraph to this chapter: since “ the impulse of appetite alone is slavery, ” we must be “ forced to be free ” by being made obedient to laws that align our private wills with the general will. Rousseau attempts to reconcile the obvious conﬂ ict between individual liberty and the higher freedom we gain in following the general will by saying that we are obeying laws that we, as reasonable beings, have prescribed for ourselves. But he acknowledges that the problem is like squaring the circle — ultimately unsolvable. As Rousseau says, it is simply a given of the human condition that “ the private will acts incessantly against the general will, ” so it is inconceivable that the two will ever be perfectly aligned. 17 But there is an approximate solution for squaring the politi- cal circle: by simplifying the setting of politics, we can make the private will and the general will coincide to a much greater degree than they do in large and complex societies. Rousseau ’ s political ideal is a gathering of peasants deciding their simple affairs under an oak tree. The smaller and simpler the polity, the more likely it is that those deciding will understand the issues, see what would best serve their mutual interest, and choose to implement this collective decision even if it does not fully satisfy their private preferences. There is an almost mathematical relationship: the further away a society is from Rousseau ’ s ideal, the less apparent or compelling the general will is to any given individual, and the greater the likelihood of the polity ’ s lapsing into an undesirable will of all. In short, if you want to achieve a rough approximation of the general will, make your polity small and simple. It follows that the setting of politics is crucial. Rousseau does not want a totalitarian reign of virtue, as some critics allege. He uses the doctrine of the general will not to justify authoritarianism but to show why it is necessary to establish social conditions that give rise to a natural reign of virtue. Unless the polity is relatively small and simple, the doctrine of the general will can be perverted to legitimate the tyranny of a majority or the dictatorship of a central committee — precisely what happened during and after the French Revolution. Rousseau ’ s “ law one has prescribed for oneself ” is not a statute law to be enforced by the authorities but a moral law that embodies the general will. This makes mores the sine qua non of a good politics. Unless the moral law is given concrete form, individuals will tend to go their own way without regard to the general will. Mores, says Rousseau, are the “ unshakeable keystone ” of politics. 18 Unfortunately, in large, complex, impersonal societies beyond any person ’ s ken or control, the temptation to ignore or ﬂ out the mores of the community becomes overwhelming. Only a relatively small, face-to-face community can exert suf- ﬁ cient moral pressure to make individuals consistently obedi- ent to the mores that force them to be “ free. ” If you want citizens to be upright and law-abiding, make your polity small and simple. Last but far from least, freedom for Rousseau is not the ability to gratify appetite but the absence of dependence. As he says in É mile , There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order [i.e., it is morally degrading], engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. 19 In other words, a large, wealthy, complex, hierarchical social order reduces the vast majority to a state of dependence and therefore destroys freedom. So if you want citizens instead of slaves, make your polity small and simple. Rousseau ’ s doctrines may sound shockingly “ illiberal ” to the contemporary ear, but consider John Locke ’ s discussion of freedom: The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on his having Reason , which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrain ’ d Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a Man, as theirs. 20 So even the author of the liberal tradition says that freedom is not “ an unrestrain ’ d Liberty. ” Despite their considerable differences, Locke and Rousseau therefore agree on this fun- damental point: man ’ s private will must be made subject to “ that Law he is to govern himself by, ” a law discovered by “ Reason. ” To frame the issue in terms of Burke ’ s syllogism, if we do not bind ourselves with moral chains, then others will do the job for us (and not necessarily to our advantage). There must be a structure of benign control to teach self-control — in other words, community mores. Locke, who made a strong civil society the linchpin of his political theory, therefore differs only in degree with Plato, Rousseau, and others (such as the psychologist B. F. Skinner) who contend that since social con- ditioning is already pervasive and controls human behavior unconsciously, we must strive to do it more consciously, com- passionately, and responsibly. It also should be said that neither Locke nor Adam Smith would approve of the ends to which their liberal doctrines have been perverted. Both are actually closer in spirit to Rousseau than to contemporary liberals because they envisaged small-hold, independent pro- prietors enjoying strong but limited property rights, not gar- gantuan, globe-straddling corporations exploiting the same rights to dominate both economy and polity.

### 1NC

We’ll offer our non-fiction against the 1AC’s fiction: The US is engaged in a three-way conflict for control over the coming global order—this conflict will be waged by cultural transformation and determine whether the world will be democratic, autocratic or theocratic

Chandler ‘8

(Robert, PhD in political science, former political strategist with the Air Force, Defense Department and the CIA, Shadow World: Resurgent Russia, the Global New Left, and Radical Islam, pg xii-xvii)

Shadow World is about the political forces hidden deeply in the shadows of international affairs. It examines a wide-range of America-haters, including those aging ones who survived the Cold War and others that have since been spawned by new transnational predators. America's unchallenged ascendance during the 1990s resulting from its position as the world's sole economic and military superpower triggered the development of a cauldron of vicious political, economic, environmental, social, and cultural anti-American centers. This seething hatred for Americans coalesced into a loose network of mutual support through three main centers of anti-U.S. activity: (1) the Kremlin's hidden hand operating from the shadow world to create conditions favorable for Russia's long-term geopolitical objectives; (2) a radical progressive-socialist-marxist web of popular fronts, agents of influence, and covert operatives fostering an anti-capitalist cultural revolution in the United States and Europe; and (3) an Islamic Salafist multinational with interconnections between al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups dedicated to restoration of a world caliphate and Saudi Arabia's plans to place Europe, Russia, and the United States under Islamic suzerainty. These three main activity hubs operate as independent centers of anti-Americanism, but there are many connections between them. Together they make up a "Faceless International" pursuing common goals of reducing U.S. power and influence in the world, while they compete for global geopolitical dominance. These shared strategic objectives offer opportunities for ad hoc support for one another, sometimes as the result of intermediaries coordinating activities and at other times simply parroting the policy line of the other. Russia, for instance, contributes to the radical Left's "peace movement" through its recycled Cold War ideological allies inside the United States. At the same time, anti-war protests against America's war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq by the homegrown radical Left and abroad are supported by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Russia, on the other hand, supports international terrorism in the form of arms transfers to enemy combatants through proxies and sub-proxies. Against this backdrop, three major geopolitical contenders, each with sufficient resources to establish a new world order, are locked in a long-term, winner-take-all competition. Their weapons are words and culture, economic strengths and diplomatic skill, political action in the open and from the world's shadows, as well as guns and bombs. The ultimate victor will win the right to exercise its power and political authority over all of the Earth's six billion people. Malachi Martin, an eminent Vatican theologian, was the first to describe the global competition that was underway to win control of all of the world's people. He declared in 1990 that "we are the stakes."2 Since Martin alerted humanity to the globalist struggle for control of our lives nearly two decades ago, one georeligious competitor, the Vatican, melded with the capitalist West, while another, Islamic Salafism, emerged as a contender to establish global rule. Much of Martin's narration about the early post-Cold War competition has spilled over into the contemporary chess match between the capitalist West, Russia and its strategic partners and Western agents of influence, and Islamic Salafism. For this we owe Martin a great debt of gratitude for giving us warning about the global geopolitical competition and urging us to take it seriously since it is our lives that hang in the balance. Today's competitive triad holds all of us at risk, Martin said: our lives, our families, our jobs, our prosperity, our property, our schools, our communities, our religions, our cultures, our general well-being, and our national identities. Who we will be depends upon which contender eventually wins. Regardless of the victor, no aspect of our lives will be immune or left untouched. The contemporary three-way geopolitical competition, like the initial global chess match described by Malachi Martin in 1990, will result in ". . . the most profound and widespread modification of international, national, and local life that the world has seen in a thousand years."' The first geopolitical competitor is the capitalist West led by the United States and Europe. Its geographic expanse stretches from the Pacific coast in North America, across the Atlantic, to the east European borders with Russia. This globalist competitor also includes the Vatican, Japan, and Oceana. The United States, emerging from the Cold War as the world's lone superpower, has served as a primary engine of economic globalization. Over the next fifty years or more, with appropriate adjustments by the industrial North to ensure the economic well-being of suppliers and .workers in the Southern Hemisphere, as well as displaced U.S. workers, globalization could result in the elimination of sovereign borders in a single, world-embracing North-South global economy. The second globalist competitor is led by Russia, which is still motivated, though secretly, by a Leninist, Party-State mentality. Moscow is joined by strategic partners that, together with Russia, make up a vast geostrategic quadrangle with China, Iran, and Cuba-Brazil-Venezuela. The Kremlin's long-term strategic goals are enveloped in a hub of denial and deception. This major strategic deception involves a rather loose but strident quadrangle of friendship and cooperation between Russia-China-Iran-Cuba/Brazil (and Venezuela). These Russian proxies and sub-proxies have energy-hungry economies that portend robust future growth. Moscow's strategic partners are also dedicated to restructuring the world security order from its current unipolar structure to a multi-national system in which Russia will hold a chair of significant influence. The reach of this global competitor stretches from the Pacific coast of Eurasia to Russia's borders in eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It also stretches from the North Sea to Central Asia, which facilitates a predominant position over the energy-rich Caspian Sea. Russia's strategic partners serve as activity centers or hubs for decentralized competitive actions in their respective regions of interest. Iran stands on the threshold of controlling a major Shiite nation consisting of the political states of Iran itself, most of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This emerging Shiite nation will stand with Russia in the Kremlin's efforts to wrest control of the world's prices for oil and natural gas from OPEC. Russia is relying on the stealthy application of Antonio Gramsci's revisionist Marxist formula for transforming the cultures of target countries over time to create the conditions necessary for Moscow to assume global leadership. Russia's goal is to create the conditions necessary for a peaceful convergence of Europe and Russia. The Kremlin's complex design for winning this strategic objective is based on engaging the Europeans in a broad series of complex commercial relationships. First among these European-Russian cooperative arrangements is Moscow's position as a principal supplier of natural gas and oil that drives the European economy. Moscow's strategy is supplemented by a vast array of progressive (socialist-marxist) agents of influence promoting the secularization of Europe and its cultural transformation to one more amenable to Antonio Gramsci's formula for acceding to power through the ballot box. The progressive-socialist-marxist agents of influence often use stealth and deceit to shape European ideas for accommodating the Kremlin's convergence goals. The third global geopolitical competitor is Islam's Salafist (Wahhabi) fundamentalism centered in Saudi Arabia. The geographic expanse of Salafist influence stretches across the Maghreb and Middle East, through Pakistan, and into India to where the Muslim and Hindu worlds meet. The Salafists, through al-Qaeda, immigration, and religious missionaries reach into Europe, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, and other Muslim nations inside Russia, Central Asia, Africa, North and South America, and Southeast Asia. The Salafist georeligious goal is to restore a global-girdling Islamic (Sunni) caliphate. The georeligious objectives of the Salafists are focused on the creation of conditions necessary for the emergence of "Eurabia." Using the complementary tools of terrorism (al-Qaeda) and immigration, Salafist rulers look forward to the time when Europe will fall into their hands like a ripened plum. The conditions for winning Europe are expected to be created over time as the native European birth rate remains low and the immigrant birth rates are high. Over time, the Islamic immigrants will be able to accede to power through the ballot box and Europe will slide into a condition of neutralization or dhimmitude. The loss of Europe to Russian or Salafist interests would be a crushing blow to the United States and gravely wound its ability to compete geopolitically. While Europe finds itself at the center of gravity in the struggle between the three globalist contenders, it remains a vital part of the capitalist West. Hence, Europe can anticipate that it will be protected by American power and influence, but only if it does not crumble from within. Both Russia and the Salafists have growing fifth columns inside Europe in readiness to rise up at the right time. The Muslim Brotherhood of North America has successfully established a major presence in the United States and Canada. It operates behind an array of fronts that mask its anti-U.S. activities. A deep hatred for the United States and Americans is a strong motivating force. The Brotherhood's strategic goal is to destroy the United States "through long-term civilization-killing" that will eliminate all religions except Islam. The Brotherhood's self-described ". . . work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within. . . ." This civilizational jihad will be accompanied by terrorist attacks, quite possibly including a nuclear 9/11. Shadow World illuminates (1) the details of the capitalist West led by the United States in pursuit of creating liberal democracies through political and economic globalization; (2) a Russian hidden hand that includes extraordinary disinformation and a vast left-wing conspiracy of denial and deceit; (3) and a radical Islamic Jihad in the name of Allah that extends its blood-sucking tentacles deeply into American society and across the globe. This geopolitical com-petition will determine which contender will win political authority over all the Earth's six billion people. The three-way globalist competition will likely run for fifty years or more in the twenty-first century. There will be many ups and downs in the long-term chess match, since each of the competitors hold strengths and exploitable vulnerabilities. The capitalist West's response to the opening moves by Russia, the revolutionary Left within the United States, and violent militant Islamists already reflects the ongoing geopolitical chess match to determine which player will dominate the twenty-first century world order. The trends, policy shifts, covert actions, international terrorism, and anti-American coalitions add up to one certainty: A late twenty-first century borderless world under a single government is in the making. The open question is whether the new world order will be autocratic, democratic, or theocratic.

Rather than voting aff to speak to power, we advocate that you shut that 1AC speech act down --- The Aff is the fifth column in the global power-struggle—endorsing their discourse plays into the hands of the Communists and turns the case

Stoos ‘8

(William Kevin, freelance writer, book reviewer, and attorney, whose feature and cover articles have appeared in Carmelite Digest, Family Digest, Nature Conservancy Magazine, Liberty Magazine, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Dangerous Illusions—Shadow World by Robert Chandler,” Canada Free Press, 10-29, http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/5896)

No one knows exactly the origin of the term “fifth column,” but Chandler cites several historical examples of “fifth columns”–dedicated, clandestine—waiting in the wings to wreak havoc on the enemy. They wait to rise up, working behind the scenes, lying in wait, ready to attack or sabotage or weaken the structure of a city, a country or a society. Not by frontal assaults do fifth columns prove their worth, but by intrigue, subtle maneuvering, and deception. Chandler’s book exposes the uncomfortable but indisputable fact that there is an active “progressive” (socialist) fifth column in the United States. It is well-financed, discreet, motivated, and, one might say—legitimate, or respectable, at least to all outward appearances. It is a group of fellow travelers, “progressives,” “marxist-leninist-communists, “ spelled in small type, and their “useful idiots” (as Lenin would say) including some well meaning protestors, activists and decent Americans who have no idea that they are being manipulated by more sinister forces. As Chandler teaches, these are not your classical “rise up and throw off your chains,” violent revolutionary Marxists. Socialism has become more subtle, more sophisticated, more urbane. It has long since evolved from defeating capitalism through violent confrontation to gnawing at its innards through subtle conversion or subversion if you will, of the host society. Gradually, socialists realized that liberal western democracies with a strong religious grounding and tied together with common beliefs, traditions, and values—culture—could not be attacked from without. The sinews of religious tradition, especially, were simply too strong to overcome. In fact, modern day socialist thinkers believed that religious values were the biggest obstacle to the spread of socialism. For socialism to succeed it had to transform society from the inside out; it could never conquer a strong democracy such as the United States by force of arms, violent overthrow, or even by direct assault on the culture. If socialism were to succeed at all, it must work from within, transform, and eventually replace, the values, customs and beliefs which bind together a strong society. In short, it could only attack and defeat a country like the United States slowly, imperceptibly, comprehensively, and above all, culturally–by convincing us to abandon that which made us great in first place. Norman Thomas, co-founder of the ACLU held that: “The American people will never knowingly adopt socialism. But under the name of ‘liberalism’ they will adopt every fragment of the socialist program until one day America will be a socialist nation, without knowing how it happened.” As Chandler’s book illustrates, this eerily prophetic statement is being played out before our eyes in the United States. Shadow World reminds us–and most Americans need reminding–that socialism did not dry up and blow away with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact it morphed, and adapted, because old-fashioned Marxist Leninist doctrine had proved an historical failure. Classical Marxist doctrine could not bring down a strong democracy with strong religious roots. In time, socialists adopted the thinking of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian socialist, who lived a short but influential life—a portion of it in spent as a political prisoner under Mussolini. Gramsci’s prison writings found fertile soil in the minds of modern day American socialists who run innocuous sounding “charities,” political cover organizations, labor unions, and church groups; organizations like ACORN, the ACLU or National Lawyers Guild, or big money radicals like George Soros. Chandler tells how Gramsci’s writings have influenced thousands of untouchable and now-tenured “progressive” [sic-socialist] college professors across the country (“teachers of destruction” in the book) who were radicalized in the 1960s, and now seek to influence thousands of young Americans who will carry the banner of Gramsci socialism into the next century. Intent on changing America by attacking its fundamental beliefs, economy, values, religions, concepts of marriage, attitudes about human life, and even its national sovereignty; intent on turning it into something it was not, they seek to transform the United States into a secular humanist, socialist state, whose sovereignty and constitutional rights are gradually ceded to international organizations like the United Nations, the World Court, and the International Criminal Court. As Shadow World illustrates, Gramscian theory–that capitalist democracies may be defeated by controlling mass media, mass organizations and public education and transforming society gradually from within—is being implemented by the fifth column American progressive movement today. Chandler’s work will not be popular among certain presidential candidates, socialist politicians, or left-wing, big money power brokers such as Soros who spent millions of his personal fortune trying single-handedly to defeat George Bush in the last election. It will not be popular with socialist-progressive think tanks and “policy institutes” like the Institute for Policy Studies whose agendas subvert our country’s interests and home and abroad and seek to erode and subordinate our individual rights to the power of the State, in the name of the common good. Chandler names names, details their organizational structures, their agendas, and the people who run them. As Chandler warns, not everything in our country is what it appears to be. Gramsci socialism—which works from within to erode our freedoms, change our values, and subordinate our national sovereignty–is subtly transforming our country every day. Chandler exposes the shadowy progressive-socialist movement in the United States to the harsh sunlight outside the cave. One has only to consider the incessant attack on our religious traditions, the ACLU’s endless legal assault on the Boy Scouts, the movement to redefine the concept of marriage, the rise of the culture of death, to know Chandler is right. One has only to consider the incessant criticism of the United States whenever it fails to consult the United Nations on any foreign policy decision, the pervasive political correctness that stifles dissent, the shouting down of any college speaker who espouse any views to the right of radical, the propagation of class warfare, and the movement to redistribute wealth, to know that our society is inching slowly, irreversibly down the path of secular humanism and socialism. The sinews of common religion, traditions, values, language and political institutions that strengthened us and made us the world’s greatest superpower, gave us the strongest economy in the world and made us a beacon of liberty and hope are fraying. Chandler’s book tells us why, and outlines perhaps the greatest threat to our society—the one from within.

And, we have an external impact: as Russia saps our will to resist, it increases their propensity for aggression and conflict

Chandler ‘8

(Robert, PhD in political science, former political strategist with the Air Force, Defense Department and the CIA, Shadow World: Resurgent Russia, the Global New Left, and Radical Islam, pg 114-117)

Putin's Geopolitical Offensive President Putin began a public whining campaign in early 2007 about U.S. international activities at the 43rd Munich Conference of Security Policy. Putin blasted the United States before an audience of major world leaders: "one single center of power. One single center of decision-making. This is a world of one master, one sovereign." He added that "today we are witnessing an almost unconstrained hyper use of force in international relations—military force." Mr. Putin continued that "primarily the United States has overstepped its national borders, and in every area." He went on about U.S. military actions as being "unilateral" and "illegitimate" and saying that "they bring us to the abyss of one conflict after another. . . . Political solutions are becoming impossible."32 In addition to wielding an energy geopolitical hammer in Europe and a verbal attack against U.S. security policies, President Putin and his generals resorted to dark Cold War rhetoric over a U.S. initiative to provide an anti-ballistic missile defense for Europe against Iranian long-range rockets, possibly nuclear-tipped, and other future threats from the Middle East. Washington explained that the interceptor missiles would be based in Poland and the acquisition radar in the Czech Republic and that the system was not intended to threaten Russia. The American explanation was summarily dismissed by the Kremlin whose strategic analysts saw the defensive system as "offensive" in so far as they viewed the ten interceptor missiles magically threatening the regional balance in Europe. If the truth was to be told, this flap was more about Russia's hurt feelings for not having been consulted ahead of time as a legitimate European power.33 "If the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic take such a step," General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russian missile forces warned, "the [Russian] strategic missiles forces will be capable of targeting these facilities if a relevant decision is made."34 Putin went so far as to compare the ten planned air defense rockets with the Cuba missile crisis in 1962. He called the proposed U.S. defense shield a needless provocation, noting that Russia had liquidated everything in Cuba." President Putin moved quickly by launching several additional initiatives with geopolitical implications. Not only promising to strengthen Russia's military with new weapons, Putin also moved to increase foreign intelligence collection. He made no bones about it—expanding Russia's espionage network was important in countering the United States in the Middle East. These Russian intelligence operations would also use disinformation to spread dissent against U.S. policies in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.36 A third geopolitical initiative was taken when Russia announced that it would expand the country's Black Sea naval base by establishing a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Most speculation centered on possible ports in Syria at Tartus and Latakia where Russian engineers have been busy in dredging operations. A presence in Syria would place Russian naval vessels near U.S. operations in Iraq, Israel, and Turkish ports with their new oil pipeline facilities. The port of Tartus would be especially useful for intelligence collection against the U.S. Sixth Fleet and Israel. Admiral Vladimir Masorin, Russia's naval commander, said that "the Mediterranean is very important strategically for the Black Sea Fleet." Military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer added that "it has been the dream of our admirals for a long time to restore our naval greatness and keep the task force we had under the Soviet Union."37 Another Russian geopolitical move in August 2007 occurred when long-range bombers were sent to Guam to challenge the U.S. naval base located on the island. Russian Major General Pavel Androsov asserted that U.S. interceptors scrambled to track the bombers. A week later, Russia launched twenty bombers to establish its broader sovereign presence; the aircraft completed twenty-hour military patrols. Russian bombers, President Putin explained, would continue to conduct long-range air patrols regularly. In September, a Russian military exercise included a strategic cruise missile attack on the United States." The Russian bombers supported a combined eight-day military exercise, "Peace Mission 2007," in China's northwestern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which included China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization. A primary focus was placed on countering terrorism, separatism, and drug and arms trafficking. China and Russia remain wary of each other, especially in Central Asia, despite their cooperation on strictly focused security issues. According to some American analysts, this move and others answer an emotional Russian need to restore some of the Cold War stature that the Soviet Union had enjoyed." China and Iran joined Russia in August 2007 by warning the United States that its interference in the resource-rich Central Asia would not be welcome. The warning coincided with the beginning of a war-game in the region. Washington had already cut back its presence in Central Asia, leaving only its NATO-support base for Afghanistan at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. Another geopolitical chess move was staking a claim to the seabed under the North Pole. According to the Kremlin, the continental shelf extending from Russia's shores covers an area the size of Western Europe. Billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas could be at stake. Moscow went so far as to dispatch a mini-submarine to place a Russian flag under the Pole. Other potential claimants to the northern seabed—the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark—were taken by surprise.41 Russia remained dismissive of some claims that the Russians had started an "Ice War" with the West. Rather, President Putin was clear that the polar move "should become a core of Russia's stance on ownership of part of the Arctic shelf."42 This series of events revealed President Putin tipping his hand about the continuing socialist competition in the shadow world of implementing Antonio Gramsci's formula for **sapping the West's will to resist**.

## Case

### Impact calc

#### Their (epistemology/ontology) arguments don’t disprove our advantages—pragmatic reasoning and specificity prove our DA is good

Kratochwil, IR Prof @ Columbia, 8 [Friedrich Kratochwil is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, Pragmatism in International Relations “Ten points to ponder about pragmatism” p11-25]

First, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or ‘things’ (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with ‘acting’ (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the ‘truth’ we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information. Precisely because the social world is characterized by strategic interactions, what a situation ‘is’, is hardly ever clear ex ante, since it is being ‘produced’ by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (‘plan B’) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple ‘discoveries’ of an already independently existing ‘reality’ disclosing itself to an ‘observer’–or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by ‘realists’ such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Buelow, in which he criticized the latter’s obsession with a strategic ‘science’ (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become anicon for realists, a few of them (usually dubbed ‘old’ realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a ‘scientific’ study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially ‘neorealists’ of various stripes, have embraced the ‘theory’-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Second, since acting in the social world often involves acting ‘for’ someone, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become ‘scientific’ would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of ‘timing’ – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general ‘theory’ of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the ‘continuity of nature’ and the ‘large number’ assumptions. Besides, ‘timing’ seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment. Third, the cure for anxiety induced by Cartesian radical doubt does not consist in the discovery of a ‘foundation’ guaranteeing absolute certainty. This is a phantasmagorical undertaking engendered by a fantastic starting point, since nobody begins with universal doubt! (Peirce 1868). Rather, the remedy for this anxiety consists in the recognition of the unproductive nature of universal doubt on the one hand, and of the fetishization of ‘rigour’ on the other. Letting go of unrealizable plans and notions that lead us to delusional projects, and acquiring instead the ability to ‘go on’ despite uncertainties and the unknown, is probably the most valuable lesson to learn. Beginning somewhere, and reflecting critically on the limitations of the starting point and the perspective it opened, is likely to lead to a more fruitful research agenda than starting with some preconceived notions of the nature of things, or of ‘science’, and then testing the presumably different (but usually quite similar) theories (such as liberalism and realism). After all, ‘progress’ in the sciences occurred only after practitioners had finally given up on the idea that in order to say something about the phenomena of the world (ta onta), one had to grasp first ‘being’ itself (to ontos on). Fourth, by giving up on the idea that warranted knowledge is generated either through logical demonstration or through the representation of the world ‘out there’, a pragmatic starting point not only takes seriously the always preliminary character of knowledge, it also promises that we will learn to follow a course of action that represents a good bet.7 Thus, it accounts for changes in knowledge in a more coherent fashion. If the world were ‘out there’, ready-made, only to be discovered, scientific knowledge would have to be a simple accumulation of more and more true facts, leading us virtually automatically closer and closer to ‘the TRUTH’. Yet, if we have learned anything from the studies of various disciplines, it is the fact that progress consists in being able to formulate new questions that could not even be asked previously. Hence, whatever we think of Kuhn’s argument about ‘paradigms’, we have to recognize that in times of revolutionary change the bounds of sense are being redrawn, and thus the newly generated knowledge is not simply a larger sector of the encircled area (Kratochwil 2000). Fifth, pragmatism recognizes that science is social practice, which is determined by rules and in which scientists not only are constitutive for the definitions of problems (rather than simply lifting the veil from nature), but they also debate seemingly ‘undecidable’ questions and weigh the evidence, instead of relying on the bivalence principle of logic as an automatic truth-finder (Ziman 1991; Kratochwil 2007a). To that extent, the critical element of the epistemological project is retained, but the ‘court’, which Kant believed to be reason itself, now consists of the practitioners themselves. Instead of applying free-standing epistemological standards, each science provides its own court, judging the appropriateness of its methods and practices. Staying with the metaphor of a court, we also have to correct an implausible Kantian interpretation of law – that it has to yield determinate and unique decisions. We know from jurisprudence and case law that cases can be decided quite differently without justifying the inference that this proves the arbitrariness of law. Determinacy need not coincide with uniqueness, either in logic (multiple equilibria), science (equifinality) or law – Ronald Dworkin (1978) notwithstanding! Sixth, despite the fact that it is no longer a function of bivalent truth conditions, or anchored neither in the things themselves (as in classical ontology) nor in reason itself, ‘truth’ has not been abolished or supplanted by an ‘anything goes’ attitude. Rather, it has become a procedural notion of rule-following according to community practices, since nobody can simply make the rules as she or he goes along. These rules do not ‘determine’ outcomes, as the classical logic of deductions or truth conditions suggest, but they do constrain and enable us in our activities. Furthermore, since rule-following does not simply result in producing multiple copies of a fixed template, rules provide orientation in new situations, allowing us to ‘go on’, making for both consistency and change. Validity no longer assumes historical universality, and change is no more conceived of as temporal reversibility, as in differential equations, where time can be added and multiplied, compared with infinity, and run towards the past or the future. Thus ‘History’ is able to enter the picture, and it matters because, differently from the old ontology, change can now be conceived of as a ‘path-dependent’ development, as a (cognitive) evolution or even as radical historicity, instead of contingency or decay impairing true knowledge. Consequently, time-bound rather than universal generalizations figure prominently in social analysis, and as Diesing, a philosopher of science, reminds us, this is no embarrassment. Being critical of the logical positivists’ search for ‘laws’ does not mean that only single cases exist and that no general statements are possible. It does mean, however, that in research: there are other goals as well and that generality is a matter of degree. Generalizations about US voting behaviour can be valid though they apply only between 1948–72 and only to Americans. Truth does not have to be timeless. Logical empiricists have a derogatory name for such changing truths (relativism); but such truths are real, while the absolute, fully axiomatized truth is imaginary. (Diesing 1991:91) Seventh, the above points show their importance when applied not only to the practices of knowledge generation but also to the larger problem of the reproduction of the social world. Luhmann (1983) suggested how rule-following solves the problem of the ‘double contingency’ of choices that allows interacting parties to relate their actions meaningfully to each other. ‘Learning’ from past experience on the basis of a ‘tit for tat’ strategy represents one possibility for solving what, since Parsons, has been called the ‘Hobbesian problem of order’. This solution, however, is highly unstable, and thus it cannot account for institutionalized behaviour. The alternative to learning is to forgo ‘learning’. Actors must abstract from their own experiences by trusting in a ‘system of expectations’ which is held to be counterfactually valid. ‘Institutionalization’ occurs in this way, especially when dispute-settling instances emerge that are based on shared expectations about the system of expectations. Thus, people must form expectations about what types of arguments and reasons are upheld by ‘courts’ in case of a conflict (Luhmann 1983). Eighth, a pragmatic approach, although sensitive to the social conditions of cognition, is not simply another version of the old ‘sociology of knowledge’, let alone of utilitarianism by accepting ‘what works’ or what seems reasonable to most people. It differs from the old sociology of knowledge that hinged on the cui bono question of knowledge (Mannheim 1936), since no argument about a link between social stratification and knowledge is implied, not to mention the further-reaching Marxist claims of false consciousness. A pragmatist approach, however, is compatible with such approaches as Bourdieu’s (1977) or more constructivist accounts of knowledge production, such as Fuller’s (1991) social epistemology, because it highlights the interdependence of semantics and social structures. Ninth, as the brief discussion of ‘science studies’ above has shown, it is problematic to limit the problem of knowledge production to ‘demonstrations’ (even if loosely understood in terms of the arguments within the scientific community), thus neglecting the factors that are conducive to (or inhibitive of) innovation in the definition of problems. To start with, antecedent to any demonstration, there has to be the step of ‘invention’, as the classical tradition already suggested. In addition, although it might well be true that ‘invention’ does not follow the same ‘logic’ as ‘testing’ or demonstrating, this does not mean that these considerations are irrelevant or can be left outside the reflection on how knowledge is generated. To attribute originality solely to a residual category of a rather naively conceived individual ‘psychology of discovery’, as logical positivism does, will simply not do. After all, ‘ideas’ are not representations and properties of the individual mind, but do their work because they are shared; innovation is crucially influenced by the formal and informal channels of communication within a (scientific) community. While the logical form of refutability in principle is, for logical positivists, a necessary element of their ‘theoretical’ enterprise, it does not address issues of creativity and innovation, which are a crucial part of the search for knowledge. Corroborating what we already suspected is interesting only if such inquiries also lead to novel discoveries, since nobody is served by ‘true’ but trivial results. Quite clearly, the traditional epistemological focus is much too narrow to account for and direct innovative research, while pragmatic approaches have notoriously emphasized the creativity of action (Rochberg-Halton 1986). Tenth, the above discussion should have demonstrated that a pragmatic approach to knowledge generation is not some form of ‘instrumentalism’ á la Friedman (1968), perhaps at basement prices, or that it endorses old wives’ tales if they generated ‘useful predictions’, even though for rather unexplainable reasons. Thus, buying several lottery tickets on the advice of an acquaintance to rid oneself of debts and subsequently hitting the jackpot neither qualifies as a pragmatically generated solution to a problem nor does it make the acquaintance a financial advisor. Although ‘usefulness’ is a pragmatic standard, not every employment of it satisfies the exacting criteria of knowledge production. As suggested throughout this chapter, a coherent pragmatic approach emphasizes the intersubjective and critical nature of knowledge generation based on rules, and it cannot be reduced to the de facto existing (or fabricated) consensus of a concrete group of scientists or to the utility of results, the presuppositions of which are obscure because they remained unexamined. Conclusions No long summary of argument is necessary here. Simply, a pragmatic turn shows itself to be consistent with the trajectory of a number of debates in the epistemology of social sciences; it also ties in with and feeds into the linguistic, constructivist and ‘historical’ turns that preceded it; and finally, it is promising for the ten reasons listed above. While these insights might be useful correctives, they do not by themselves generate viable research projects. This gain might have been the false promise of the epistemological project and its claim that simply following the path of a ‘method’ will inevitably lead to secure knowledge. Disabusing us of this idea might be useful in itself because it would redirect our efforts at formulating and conceptualizing problems that are antecedent to any ‘operationalization’ of our crucial terms (Sartori 1970), or of any ‘tests’ concerning which ‘theory’ allegedly explains best a phenomenon under investigation.

#### consequences are key

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### Doing things – 1nc

#### The aff’s method prioritizes observations without pragmatic strategy ---- continues to re-entrench the squo

Bryant 12 (Levi, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are **making** real **differences**. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is **the worst sort of abstraction** (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, **the academic left** falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at **proposing** any sort of **realistic constructions** of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a **workable alternative**. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:

The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶

Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶

Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:

¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶

Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, **we express them in ways that** only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the **greatest friend** of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people **into** the embrace of **reigning ideology** than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our **critique-intoxicated cynics** and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

# 2nc

## Rights K

#### This selfishness makes all impacts inevitable---- vote neg if we prove liberation is the root cause

**Ophuls,** member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University. He is the author of Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, which won the International Studies Association’s Sprout Prize and the American Political Science Association’s Kammerer Award, **1997**  **[**William, *Requiem for Modern Politics*]

In the end, therefore, not only did the Enlightenment paradigm of politics fail to achieve many of its avowed goals--for example, equality (at least to the extent hoped)--but it also inflicted a wanton destruction on the world, becoming thereby both its own worst enemy and the author of new forms and possibilities of tyranny undreamt of by ancient despots. Everything that does not work, all that we hate and fear about the modern way of life, is the logical or even foreordained consequence of the basic principles we have chosen to embrace. Explosive population growth, widespread habitat destruction, disastrous pollution, and every other aspect of ecological devastation; increasing crime and violence, runaway addictions of every kind, the neglect or abuse of children, and every other form of social breakdown; antinomianism, nihilism, millenarianism, and every other variety of ideological madness; hyperpluralism, factionalism, administrative despotism, and every other manifestation of democratic decay; weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the structural poverty of underdevelopment, and many other global pathologies--all are deeply rooted in Hobbesian politics, whose basic principles set up a vicious circle of power seeking and self-destruction. In other words, the most intractable problems of our age are due not to human nature itself but, instead, to the way in which the Enlightenment in general and Hobbesian politics in particular have encouraged the worst tendencies of human nature to flourish in the modern era.

#### They can’t win they solve:

#### Only top-down, centralized imposition of constraints on freedom can guarantee planetary survival---their ethic will inevitably fail to improve ecological outcomes---an accelerating crisis makes authoritarianism inevitable, and the worse the environment gets, the worse the constraints on freedom will be

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15

In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare, the case is made by Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost paralysed; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4 Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally reducing our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world. For this reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and self-preservation.” (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also believes that in certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example) 'democracy must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent people. The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968). The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N. Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - £, where £ is the difference between the full stock catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker. In terms of democracy, what this entails is that, in general, we have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998: 682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks. Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that people can agree to coerce each other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be 'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice, democracy or ecological survival.

#### Their participation in deliberative forums is disempowering and exacerbates power differentials within communities---turns the whole case and means decisions are worse than they’d be with no deliberation at all

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 66-67

As noted earlier, one of the strongest arguments in favor of deliberative democracy is that such participation has intrinsic benefits for citizens. Not all agree with this assertion. Some scholars argue that the inverse is true, that participation can injure citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and powerlessness. Real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 191). Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that "[w]hen people come into contact with those who are different, they become better citizens, as indicated in their values and behavior" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 232); however, to get the full benefits of associational involvement, the groups must be diverse. The logic here is straightforward - to experience the benefits of deliberation, one must hear a variety of viewpoints. Despite this argument, social psychology research indicates that it is difficult to get people involved in heterogeneous groups, and that when they do join such a group, they tend to interact with groups members who are similar to them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005; Sunstein, 2003).

## Russians k

### ----2NC Overview

Outweighs-- A US-Russian war is the only scenario for extinction. This existential risk outweigh diseases, world wars, and smaller nuclear wars because of future generations

BOSTROM ‘2

(Dr. Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at YALE, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 3-8-02, <http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html>)

**A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that **a smaller nuclear exchange**, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: · Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. · We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. · Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. · **If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor**, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].

The historical linkage between conquest and nation-building makes imperialism a cornerstone of the Russian identity

Pipes ‘9

(Richard, Frank B. Baird Jr. professor of history, emeritus, at Harvard, WSJ, “Pride and Power,” 8-21, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550604574358733790418994.html)

One aspect of the "great power" syndrome is imperialism. In 1991, Russia lost her empire, the last remaining in the world, as all her colonies, previously disguised as "union republics" separated themselves to form sovereign states. This imperial collapse was a traumatic experience to which most Russians still cannot adjust themselves. The reason for this lies in their history. England, France, Spain and the other European imperial powers formed their empires overseas and did so after creating national states: As a result, they never confused their imperial possessions with the mother country. Hence, the departure of the colonies was for them relatively easy to bear. Not so in the case of Russia. Here, the conquest of the empire occurred concurrently with the formation of the nation-state: Furthermore, there was no ocean to separate the colonies. As a result, the loss of empire caused confusion in the Russians' sense of national identity. They have great difficulty acknowledging that the Ukraine, the cradle of their state, is now a sovereign republic and fantasize about the day when it will reunite with Mother Russia. They find it only slightly less difficult to acknowledge the sovereign status of Georgia, a small state that has been Russian for over two centuries. The imperial complex underpins much of Russia's foreign policy. These imperial ambitions have received fresh expression from a bill which President Medvedev has submitted in mid-August to parliament. It would revise the existing Law of Defense which authorizes the Russian military to act only in response to foreign aggression. The new law would allow them to act also "to return or prevent aggression against another state" and "to protect citizens of the Russian Federation abroad." It is easy to see how incidents could be provoked under this law that would allow Russian forces to intervene outside their borders.

### AT: Indicts—Media Deception

The only sources that aren’t tainted by the KGB are those that have no connection with Russian military intelligence, professorships or large book deals

Nyquist ‘9

(J.R, renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, “Never Ask the Wolves to Help You Against the Dogs,” 8-21, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/analysis.html)

But the reader must stop and set all this aside. In Russia all facts are attended by a bodyguard of fiction. Wild opinions bearing the character of insanity, mixed with conspiracy theory, mixed with rumor, mixed with fantastic speculations and a dash of truth -- leaves everyone hypnotized by an illusory parade of vivid images. In Filin's account of the Arctic Sea, everything is probable except for the concluding details; and nothing is independently verified. The story is about a superpower struggle involving the Middle East, but ends up centering on the conflict between Moscow and Kiev. The president of Ukraine, who was poisoned by the KGB five years ago, is fighting against pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian government. He struggles against pro-Russian voices in the Ukrainian media. He struggles against a parliament dominated by Russian agents. Is it not outrageous that American special forces siezed the Arctic Sea? Is it not outrageous that Ukraine's president should take the side of the United States? One may assume there were negotiations between Moscow and Washington, and a resolution of the matter. (Perhaps the missiles would have to return to Russia.) But the truth of the matter? If you want to find the truth about Russia, if you want to penetrate the reality of Russia's KGB regime, then you should not seek the truth among the paid minions and military hangers-on of the Soviet past. The truth, in our time, is more likely to come from people who have no ties to Russian military intelligence, no professorships, no large book deals, and no part in Moscow's ongoing disinformation campaign. On the American side, the situation is no different. The deepest truths do not appear in the major media, at the offices of the CIA or NSA, or within Congress, or the State Department.

Dr. Chandler is literally the most qualified person ever about the threats facing the US today

Stoos ‘8

(William Kevin, freelance writer, book reviewer, and attorney, whose feature and cover articles have appeared in Carmelite Digest, Family Digest, Nature Conservancy Magazine, Liberty Magazine, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Dangerous Illusions—Shadow World by Robert Chandler,” Canada Free Press, 10-29, http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/5896)

Chandler’s years of research, investigation and documentation of the threats to our society have resulted in the most comprehensive work to date on the real threats facing this country in the world today. And he should know whereof he speaks. Chandler’s credentials are impeccable and make him uniquely qualified to warn us. Dr. Chandler, who holds a doctorate in political science from George Washington University, is not merely an intellectual with an opinion on foreign affairs like so many talking heads in the mass media. A retired Vietnam veteran and Air Force Colonel, Dr. Chandler has extensive experience in intelligence analysis, defense strategy, and nuclear weapons deployment which few can boast. He has served at the highest levels of the Defense Department, the Strategic Air Command, and NATO Europe, and received the Defense Department’s Meritorious Service Medal. He has advised the White House; the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Justice; and the Central Intelligence Agency. During the Cold War he served as strategic analyst in the Air Force “Skunk Works” Strategy Division and as a nuclear weapons planner. Dr. Chandler has written numerous articles and several books, including The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam (1981); and Tomorrow’s War, Today’s Decision on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Few posses his depth of experience and knowledge, or are as uniquely qualified to warn us of the dangers facing this country. And we need to listen to such voices. Whether they be geopolitical, religious, or cultural, our adversaries are real—not illusions—and bound by a common desire: to challenge our power, subvert out culture, undermine our values and destroy the country as we know it.

## Case

### Truth

#### Imagining scenarios, even if unlikely or flawed in construction, is key to good analysis—the Aff isn’t a research paper, don’t grade it like one

Wimbush ‘8 – director of the Center for Future Security Strategies

(S. Enders, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of several books and policy articles, “A Parable: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down”, Asia Policy, Number 5 (January 2008), 7-24)

What if the U.S.-ROK security relationship were to break down? This essay explores the alternative futures of such a scenario. Analyzing scenarios is one technique for trying to understand the increasing complexity of strategic environments. A scenario is an account of an imagined sequence of events. The intent of a scenario is to suggest how alternative futures might arise and where they might lead, where conflicts might occur, how the interests of different actors might be challenged, and the kinds of strategies actors might pursue to achieve their objectives. Important to keep in mind is that scenarios are nothing more than invented, in-depth stories—stories about what different futures could look like and what might happen along plausible pathways to those futures. The trends and forces that go into building a scenario may be carefully researched, yet a scenario is not a research paper. Rather, it is a work of the imagination. As such, scenarios are, first, tools that can help bring order to the way analysts think about what might happen in future security environments; second, scenarios are a provocative way of revealing possible dynamics of future security environments that might not be apparent simply by projecting known trends into the future. Scenarios are particularly useful in suggesting where the interests and actions of different actors might converge or collide with other forces, trends, attitudes, and influences. By using scenarios, to explore the question “what if this or that happened?” in a variety of different ways, with the objective of uncovering as many potential answers as possible, analysts can build hedging strategies for dealing with many different kinds of potential problems. Though they may choose to discount some of these futures and related scenarios, analysts will not be ignorant of the possibilities, with luck avoiding having to say: “I never thought about that.”

### Impact

#### No root cause - strikes allow more ethical deliberation- net more ethical

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The argument that the ethical justification for UAVs is threatened if UAV¶ operators are more likely to behave unjustly in their combat actions due to¶ this cognitive dissonance is unsound. First, it can be argued that the¶ temptation for the warfighter to commit jus in bello violations would actually¶ lessen, perhaps significantly so, once the warfighter is not at risk. The remote¶ pilot can take more time in evaluating a target before firing to ensure that¶ target is an enemy combatant than they would be able to otherwise; for in¶ the worst case scenario a machine is lost, not a human pilot. Returning to the¶ bomb squad analogy, in using a robot the EOD technicians do not experience¶ the same level of stress because there is no danger to themselves; thus, they¶ are not as nervous and, presumably, more successful. The same could hold¶ true for UAV pilots making judicious decisions in combat. Once fear for their¶ own safety is not a pressing concern, one would assume the operator would¶ be more capable, not less, of behaving justly. But perhaps this is not the case. Maybe the distance and disjunct of this¶ level of remote weaponry does create a significant and genuinely new kind of¶ stress on warfighters that might compromise their abilities to behave justly.¶ There is significant empirical work here yet to be done. But even if we grant¶ that displaced combat harms UAV pilots’ abilities, first note that there are¶ means of overcoming this problem and, second, that this issue is not a knock¶ against the ethical justification of UAVs themselves. If necessary we could,¶ for example, move all UAV operators much closer to the theater of combat;¶ forcing them to live in a deployed environment, along the same time-zone as¶ the combat, and under more standard battlefield conditions and stresses.25¶ Further, note that all UAV action has the ability to be recorded and¶ monitored. By default since it is remotely controlled, whatever data feed a UAV pilot received can easily be overseen by many others simultaneously and¶ later for review and critique. This added level of accountability could be used¶ to get, if necessary, further added layers of scrutiny over lethal decisionmaking even demanding more than one officer agree to a kill, for example.¶ Indeed, an entire team of officers and human rights lawyers could oversee¶ every single lethal decision made by a UAV, if desired or deemed necessary.¶ The point is that there are a variety of ways to overcome any concerns that the¶ pilots of UAVs would be somehow less judicious on average than inhabited¶ weapon systems would be. All of this argues against this cognitive dissonance¶ problem as being somehow insurmountable, much less negating the ethical¶ obligation for UAV use in principle. Moreover, even if there is some¶ psychological harm done to UAV pilots that we cannot overcome, it certainly¶ seems that such harm would be less damaging than the expected harm that¶ could come about via inhabited flights.

**Dickinson, 2004**

(Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

A second example is Geoff Eley’s masterful synthetic introduction to a collection of essays published in 1996 under the title Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930. Eley set forth two research agendas derived from his review of recent hypotheses regarding the origins and nature of Nazism. One was to discover what allowed so many people to identify with the Nazis. The second was that we explore the ways in which welfare policy contributed to Nazism, by examining “the production of new values, new mores, new social practices, new ideas about the good and efficient society.” Eley suggested that we examine “strategies of policing and constructions of criminality, notions of the normal and the deviant, the production and regulation of sexuality, the . . . understanding of the socially valued individual . . . the coalescence of racialized thinking . . .”62 So far so good; but why stop there? Why not examine the expanding hold of the language of rights on the political imagination, or the disintegration of traditional authority under the impact of the explosive expansion of the public sphere? Why not pursue a clearer understanding of ideas about the nature of citizenship in the modern state; about the potentials of a participatory social and political order; about human needs and human rights to have those needs met; about the liberation of the individual (including her sexual liberation, her liberation from ignorance and sickness, her liberation from social and economic powerlessness); about the physical and psychological dangers created by the existing social order and how to reduce them, the traumas it inflicted and how to heal them? In short, why not examine how the construction of “the social” — the ideas and practices of the modern biopolitical interventionist complex — contributed to the development of a democratic politics and humane social policies between 1918 and 1930, and again after 1945? Like Fritzsche’s essay, Eley’s accurately reflected the tone of most of those it introduced. In the body of the volume, Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics “did not ‘automatically’ or ‘naturally’ lead to the rise of National Socialism,” but rather “provided . . . the political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist strategies.”63 This is correct; but the language of biopolitics was demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists, and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also capitalize, and did. Or again, Jean Quataert remarked—quite rightly, I believe — that “the most progressive achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded” in biopolitical discourse. She also commented that Nazi policy was “continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time” and was a product of “an extreme form of technocratic reason” and “early twentieth-century modernity’s dark side.” The implication seems to be that “progressive” welfare policy was fundamentally “dark”; but it seems more accurate to conclude that biopolitics had a variety of potentials.64 Again, the point here is not that any of the interpretations offered in these pieces are wrong; instead, it is that we are, collectively, so focused on unmasking the negative potentials and realities of modernity that we have constructed a true, but very one-sided picture. The pathos of this picture is undeniable, particularly for a generation of historians raised on the Manichean myth— forged in the crucible of World War II and the Cold War— of the democratic welfare state. And as a rhetorical gesture, this analysis works magnificently — we explode the narcissistic self-admiration of democratic modernity by revealing the dark, manipulative, murderous potential that lurks within, thus arriving at a healthy, mature sort of melancholy. But this gesture too often precludes asking what else biopolitics was doing, besides manipulating people, reducing them to pawns in the plans of technocrats, and paving the way for massacre. In 1989 Detlev Peukert argued that any adequate picture of modernity must include both its “achievements” and its “pathologies”— social reform as well as “Machbarkeitswahn,” the “growth of rational relations between people” as well as the “swelling instrumental goal-rationality,” the “liberation of artistic and scientific creativity” as well as the “loss of substance and absence of limits [Haltlosigkeit].”65 Yet he himself wrote nothing like such a “balanced” history, focusing exclusively on Nazism and on the negative half of each of these binaries; and that focus has remained characteristic of the literature as a whole. What I want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not happening is just that: a place where something is not —yet— happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it does not need to be investigated or explained.

### 2nc - case

#### **aff’s method destroys argument testing and political solutions ----- decision-making skills become ignored for unaccountable policymaking**

Chandler 9 (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Questioning Global Political Activism”, What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 81-2)

However, politics is **no less important** to many of us today. Politics still gives us a sense of social connection and social rootedness and gives meaning to many of our lives. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. We are less likely to engage in the formal politics of representation - of elections and governments - but in post-territorial politics, a politics where there is much less division between the private sphere and the public one and much less division between national, territorial, concerns and global ones. This type of politics is on the one hand ‘global’ but, on the other, highly individualised: it is very much the politics of our everyday lives – the sense of meaning we get from thinking about global warming when we turn off the taps when we brush our teeth, take our rubbish out for recycling or cut back on our car use - we might also do global politics in deriving meaning from the ethical or social value of our work, or in our subscription or support for good causes from Oxfam to Greenpeace and Christian Aid. I want to suggest that when we do ‘politics’ nowadays it is **less** the ‘old’ politics, **of** self-interest, political parties, and **concern for governmental power**, than the ‘new’ politics of global ethical concerns. I further want to suggest that the forms and content of this new global approach to the political are more akin to religious beliefs and practices than to the forms of our social political engagement in the past. Global politics is similar to religious approaches in three vital respects: 1) global post-territorial politics are no longer concerned with power, its’ concerns are free-floating and in many ways, existential, about how we live our lives; 2) global politics revolve around practices with are private and individualised, they are about us as individuals and our ethical choices; 3) the practice of global politics tends to **be** non-instrumental, we do not subordinate ourselves to collective associations or parties and are more likely to give value to our aspirations, acts, or the fact of our awareness of an issue, as an end in-itself. It is as if we are upholding our goodness or ethicality in the face of an increasingly confusing, problematic and alienating world – our politics in this sense are an expression or voice, in Marx’s words, of ‘the heart in a heartless world’ or ‘the soul of a soulless condition’. The practice of ‘doing politics’ as a form of religiosity is a highly conservative one. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ - this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine social engagement and transformation. I want to argue that global ethical politics reflects and institutionalises our sense of disconnection and social atomisation and **results in** irrational andunaccountable government policy making. I want to illustrate my points by briefly looking at the practices of global ethics in three spheres, those of radical political activism, government policy making and academia. Radical activism People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are **highly** individualised and **personal** ones - there is **no attempt to build** a social or collective **movement**. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are **more concerned with** the creation of **a sense of community** through differences **than with** any **political debate**, shared agreement or **collective purpose**. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, that political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions, it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that **political activism** is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems **is preferable** to engaging with other people who are often **dismissed as uncaring** or brain-washed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever increasing awareness of themselves and by giving **‘political’ meaning to every personal action**. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its **rejection of** any form of **social movement** or organisation. Strange as it may seem, **the only people** who are **keener on global ethics** than radical activists **are political elites**. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that ‘foreign policy is no longer foreign policy’ (Timothy Garten Ash, ‘Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for’, 26 April 2007), this is certainly true. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing ‘identity’. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the ‘value-based’ interventions from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blair’s recent Foreign Affairs article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, 86:1 (2007), pp.79–90). Governments **have been more than happy to put** global **ethics at the top** of the political agenda for - the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere – the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making based on a clear political programme to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict etc – of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the US or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the ‘civilised world’, NATO or the EU are on the line in ‘wars of choice’ from the war on terror to the war on global warming lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of Realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or cohere political programmes. As Baudrillard suggests, without a connection to the ‘represented’ masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’ (In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, for example). It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. As Donald Rumsfeld stated about the war on terror, ‘there are no metrics’ to help assess whether the war is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber once counterposed this type of politics – the ‘ethics of conviction’ – to the ‘ethics of responsibility’ in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues from war crimes to EU membership requirements. Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism’s ontological focus. It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with ‘what is’ as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a **process of wishful thinking** rather than one of **engagement**, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes **‘**me-search’ rather than research**.** We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull’s (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead. The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are **more concerned** with our reflectivity – the awareness of our own ethics and values – than with **engaging with the world**, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world. Conclusion I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is **less** and less an activity based on social **engagement** and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy. Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God. Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the **external consequences of our ‘political’ acts**. What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory – the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage **with our peers** and colleagues at the level of **political or intellectual debate** and organisation.

# 1nr

### Module – game space – highlight down

#### Don’t treat the debate round like a classroom – debate is a competitive activity –---- it’s better to solve

Zompetti ‘4 --- Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September 2004 Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25

The second major problem with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization. Dana Cloud (1998) poignantly argues that when focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation? If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively2 and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions and incoherent policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded? It is very difficult, if not impossible, to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments, creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination. Or, as Cloud suggests, such therapeutic arguments "deflect [sic] the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems (1998, p. 34). In addition, these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition. While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred as a result of personalizing debate, the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization (and their solutions) than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament. During squad meetings and coaching sessions, one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about what topicality argument, framework argument, or counter-narrative will be deployed to win the judge's ballot. The problem of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination of more important factors such as resource disparity.Thus, the underlying therapeutic nature of personalized debate, coupled with the competitive component of trying to win debate rounds nullifies any chance at a fruitful and productive discussion about the problems of marginalization and their potential solutions. A focus on the personal – my experience, my narrative, my feelings, how I learn, how I can engage the community – is quite seductive; we all want to know how we fit into the larger structure of the community. And, given the intense nature of our activity, it is easy to get lost in how our feelings of hard work, emotional attachment, anxiety, despair, excitement, success, and so on become interfaced with larger community trends. Ultimately, however, a focus on the personal is a dead-end. The community's composition of multiple persons, who become focused on themselves, ignores the community at large. This can be seen with the move toward personalizing debating. Instead of examining problems of resource disparity (high costs of travel, scholarships, lack of novice tournaments, disparate coaching staffs, etc.) which plague debaters and debate programs throughout the country,1 the personalization arguments focus on different styles of debating (slow vs. fast, hip-hop vs. traditional evidence), individual identity (black vs. white, privileged vs. marginalized), and praxis (I'm doing something about the problem vs. you're not). Indeed, as Cloud argues, the "privatizing, normalizing, and marginalizing discourses of the therapeutic are incompatible with a public-, policy-, and change-oriented definition of politics" (1998, p. 7).

#### they can’t access their offense --- Maintaining game rules is not the type of consensus they critique

Robert Tally, English – Texas State University, 2007, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2

Mouffe's image of a we/they politics in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony looks a bit like organized sports. Consider the football game: rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle for dominance, with a clear winner and loser, yet agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself (i.e., the political association) in order to achieve the side's particular goals. Football teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus, but victory. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured. If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. Responding to the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association), Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52) Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all. A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair ("you get a head start"), more safe ("no hitting"), more interesting ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, but the specifics of how the game is played can vary. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But this model at least provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide? These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

#### Requires reference to Legislation

Black’s Law Dictionary 2013

(ONLINE LEGAL DICTIONARY 2nd Edition, <http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/>)

What is STATUTORY RESTRICTION?¶ Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling [legislation](http://thelawdictionary.org/legislation/).¶

### Jentleson

#### Our educational model is best

Jentleson ‘2 (Bruce W. Jentleson, Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 169-183, “Bringing Policy Relevance Back In”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092106>, Spring 2002)

So, a Washington for- eign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are sup- posed to be the scholars and students of international affairs-Why did it hap- pen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance-too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it.1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap."2 The events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conver- sations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'etre. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum."3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the aca- demic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self- servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued. September 11 Questions: Answers from the International Relations Literature? What knowledge is most needed to understand September 11 and the ques- tions posed about its causes, consequences, and the policy agenda it has set? And what answers do political scientists and especially international relations specialists have to offer? Four sets of questions need to be considered.